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VABSTRACT
Criminal Justice and the Mentally Retarded
(September 1977)
Joseph P, Cozzolino, B.S., California State College
M.S., California State College
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor Ellis Olim
The present work examines how courts in the United States decide
the issue of criminal responsibility when faced with a mentally
retarded defendant. Mental Retardation is defined as subaverage intell-
igence existing concurently with significant deficits in adaptive
behavior and originating during the first eighteen years of life.
Most of the research results in the field of mental retardation are
clouded by faulty diagnoses caused by problematic instruments and
procedures. Although these results are not clear, data bearing on
issues such as incidence, ability levels as related to classification,
and relation to criminality are examined.
Anglo-American thoughts on criminal responsibility are traced back
to the twelfth century with the introduction of the concept of mens rea
into the English legal system. Mens rea or "guilty mind" has been
interpreted to mean moral knowledge, and knowledge of; consequences con-
cerning ones behavior, intentions and motives. Prior to -he acceptance
of mens rea, only the criminal act itself was necessary for conviction.
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In order to Identify individuals who should not be held responsible,
courts developed tests and procedures. Since legal systems are
heavily dependent on precedent many of the current problems in
identifying these individuals have roots early in this history.
The M Naghten case in 1843 is the most significant occurrence in
the history of thought on legal insanity. The M'Naghten rules are
currently used in most of the United States. Other tests in use are
t-he irresistible—impulse test, the Model Penal Code standard, and
the product rule. All of these tests have received more than ample
criticism. An examination of this criticism reveals a similarity
in content. Indeed, many problems tend to be passed from one test to
another. Since decisions regarding criminal responsibility are
inevitably subjective and they are made in an emotionally charged
atmosphere, it is likely that many critics also sense the impossibility
of making a fair judgement in that situation.
Punishment and treatment frequently occupy a central place in
writings on the topic of criminal responsibility. Those relieved of
criminal responsibility are to receive treatment and those held respon-
sible are to receive punishment. This thinking, therefore, equates
prisons with punishment and mental health and mental retardation
institutions with treatment. The concepts of punishment and treatment
are defined and compared on a theoretical level. In order to determine
how well these institutions function within their theoretical roles
an examination of their histories and how they presently function is
vii
conducted. This examination reveals that all three types of institutions
frequently represent punishment in the extreme. In order for the issue
of criminal responsibility to have any meaning, those relieved of
responsibility must, if incarceration becomes necessary, receive
treatment.
Normalization, a dominant principle in human services, is defined
as the use of means which are as culturally normative as possible
in order to establish and/or maintain personal behavior and character-
istics which are as culturally normative as possible. The application
of normalization to the issue under consideration indicates that it
would not be wise to relieve all retarded persons of criminal respon-
sibility. Rather, retarded persons should be considered responsible
and only if it can be shown that an accused individual lacks the ability
to assume this responsibility should relief be granted.
This work recommends that the issue of criminal responsibility be
removed from criminal proceedings. The concept of mans rea is inter-
preted to mean the ability to make rational decisions. Since guardian-
ship and competency also speak to this ability a finding of incompetence
in a guardianship hearing is equated with the inability to assume
criminal responsibility. Such a procedure would make it possible to
decide criminal responsibility for a given individual outside of the
emotionally charged atmosphere of a criminal proceeding. Recommendations
regarding the implementation of this procedure are also included.
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PREFACE
The motivation to produce this work grew out of the author's
experiences in the field of mental retardation. Changes which have
occurred and continue to occur in the field are enabling retarded
persons to be a part of the mainstream of American life. The times
when retarded persons could effectively be segregated for life
from the rest of society are slowly dying away. As a result of this
increased desegregation, the author has found himself on a number
of occasions either accompanying mentally retarded clients to court
or speaking to police or prosecuting attorneys regarding the behavior
of clients. In these instances, the responses of the criminal justice
system can only he described as consistently inconsistent.
This confusion on the part of the criminal justice system prompted
the author to explore the issue of criminal responsibility. This
work is designed to serve as an educational device for legislators,
persons involved with our criminal justice system, and persons concerned
with the well-being of the mentally retarded. When this project was
conceived it was hoped that the recommendations made in the final chapter
would at some future time be adopted as law.
In order to accomplish this, a search of relevant literature was
conducted. Since the vast bulk of literature on criminal responsibility
addresses the issue from the perspective of mental illness, much of the
discussion revolves around mental illness and so-called insanity. The
approach has been to examine the issue through the perspective of
ix
existing literature and then to determine the relevance that material
has for the retarded person. This document does not include a com-
prehensive review of the types of treatment which should be provided
to offenders. However, since what happens to an offender cannot be
completely divorced from decisions regarding responsibility, the
disposition of offenders relieved of responsibility is discussed in
the final chapter. Finally, this work is limited in that while it
can examine the problems which have occurred in determining criminal
responsibility and recommend changes consistent with current knowledge,
it cannot measure the probable impact of these recommended changes
on our criminal justice system.
The paper will be divided into seven chapters. Chapter I clearly
specifies the problem and its importance.
Chapter II contains a discussion of mental retardation including
a description of the condition, its prevalence, identification and
classification, and its relationship to criminal activity.
In Chapter III the history of thought on criminal responsibility
in Anglo-Saxon law is traced in order to provide historical perspective.
The M'Naghten or other later rules are not considered in this discussion.
Of particular interest in this chapter is the determination of how rules
or laws regarding criminal responsibility are developed.
Chapter IV examines, contemporary rules regarding criminal respon-
sibility, Included here is a review and critique of the M'Naghten rules,
the irresistible-impulse test, the product rule, the Model Penal Code
recommendations, and other proposals.
XChapter V examines the punishment—versus—treatment controversy.
In order to treat the topic adequately it is examined on both
theoretical and applied levels. This topic is critical since there
is a considerable amount of controversy currently over the dis-
tinctions which have been drawn by various authors between punishment
and treatment.
Chapter VI examines the concept of normalization and its signifi-
cance for determining criminal responsibility.
Chapter VII specifies the recommended changes in methods of
determining criminal responsibility among mentally retarded offenders.
Additionally, a limited discussion is presented of what considerations
the court should take into account when deciding the disposition of
a case where the defendant has been found not responsible.
xi
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1CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
The purpose of criminal law is, practically speaking, to define
and reduce the incidence of criminal behavior within a given society.
The rising crime rate in the United States testifies to the fact that
the present criminal law system is failing in one of its purposes
(Clark, 1970).
The other purpose, that of defining criminal behavior, has been
equally difficult to achieve. Some writers have stated that criminality
snould be based upon whether or not an act interferes with the public
peace (Bishop, 1882, p. 125). This, of course, is an oversimplification.
In fact, the defining of criminal behavior involves two separate pro-
blems. First, society must decide which acts are criminal and label
them as such. Second, the conditions which render an individual incap-
able of committing criminal acts must be identified. In Anglo-American
law, individuals are not considered criminally responsible when these
conditions are mat. Therefore, regardless of the behavior such persons
exhibit, their acts are not labelled criminal.
The issue under investigation here is how the criminal justice
system makes decisions regarding criminal responsibility for mentally
retarded persons. The making of these decisions is dependent, of
course, on the fact that society as a whole, rather than a few isolated
individuals, has an impact on the specification of justice. The product
of this work will be recommendations concerning how courts should decide
criminal responsibility for the mentally retarded.
2The determination of criminal responsibility for persons with
mental disabilities has been, and continues to be, a deceptively com-
plex problem for our legal system. Superficially, it appears that
courts might simply define the types and degrees of seriousness of
mental defects which may be considered to relieve a defendant of
responsibility, relying heavily on the opinions of psychiatrists and
other experts for guidance (as has been done). In fact, however, these
experts are seldom able to agree among themselves on this criterion.
During trials in American courts a tacit assumption is made that
persons are responsible for their behavior. When the responsibility
question is raised by the defense, two issues must be decided. First,
has evidence been produced which indicates that the defendant is or was
at the time the illegal act was committed suffering from a mental con-
dition (defined by law) which could relieve him of criminal respon-
sibility? Second, if he was suffering from such a condition, does he
have the characteristics which are called for in the criminal respon-
sibility test in use in that state? Only when both questions are
answered affirmatively is relief granted. Since it is the respon-
sibility of a jury to answer these questions, the test utilized by a
given state is primarily found within instructions to juries.
Currently, in the United States, the following tests are used to
determine criminal responsibility:
.The M'Naghten Rules
.Irresistible-Impulse Test
.The Product Rule
.The Model Penal Code
3At leas t theoretically
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criminal responsibility and these tests
are dependent on the concept of mens rea . Mens rea
, in Anglo-American
law, states that in order for an act to be criminal, a "guilty mind"
must be present. Mens rea involves moral knowledge and knowledge of
consequences concerning one's behavior, intentions, and motives.
/
Additionally, mens rea assumes the ability to make rational choices.
The answer to the question of criminal responsibility has profound
implications for a defendant. In extreme cases it can mean the differ-
ence between life and death. In less dramatic instances it can mean the
difference between release and incarceration or treatment versus punish-
ment. Treatment versus punishment is used as a major argument by many
authors when calling for change. The exact meaning of this argument
will be explored in a later chapter.
Although numerous writers have addressed the problem of criminal
responsibility, most efforts have tended to focus exclusively on mental
illness as the defect which limits responsibility. Mental Retardation,
while it may be mentioned as a limiting condition is almost never fully
explored. For example. The American Bar Foundation, the legal research
affiliate of the American Bar Association, has recently published an
intensive study entitled The Mentally Disabled and the Law, (Brakel &
Rock, 1971). In the Introduction to that study the definition of mental
disability includes mental deficiency (p. xv) . However, xn dxscussxng
criminal law this study does not direct any attention to those
issues
which concern the mentally retarded.
Why the retarded have been excluded from these discussions
and
the retarded have certainly been a generallystudies is unclear, but
4ignored group until recently (Kanner, 1964, p. 7). The neglect cannot
be attributed to a lack of contact between our courts and the mentally
retarded (Marsh, Friel, and Eissler, 1975), for the retarded appear to
have greater contact with the criminal justice system than the in-
cidence or this condition in society would seem to warrant. And there
is reason to believe that the contact between the criminal justice
system and the mentally retarded will increase. The primary reason for
this is the current evolution of philosophy within the field of mental
retardation. At the turn of the century professionals in the field
believed that institutionalization was the only option for the vast
majority of the retarded (e.g. Fernald, 1912). Recently, many have
recognized that the detrimental effects of institutionalization out-
weigh its advantages (Roos, 1970, p. 34), and thus, institutionalization
of the retarded is currently being discouraged (Luckey a Newman, 1975;
O'Conner & Sitkei, 1975). Second, community alternatives, consistent
with this change in philosophy, are being developed. These alternatives
have decreased the number of admittances to institutions and have also
enabled institutionalized individuals to move to community based
residences (Conely, 1973, p. 82). Third, class action right-to-treat-
ment suits are being heard and, at least in one instance, the court
•has granted a summary judgement including the requirement to provide the
least restrictive possible residential setting for retarded individuals
(Davis v. Watkins 1974). Findings such as this one can have dramatic
impact on the residential services provided to retarded persons. It
seems reasonable to conclude that as the number of retarded persons
living within community settings increases, there will be increased
5contact between these individuals and our courts.
The continual development of community-based residential services
demands that the presently ambiguous laws regarding the mentally
retarded offender be addressed and clarified, and a set of guidelines
ha formed for the use of courts in deciding criminal responsibility
when confronted with a mentally retarded defendant.
6CHAPTER II
MENTAL RETARDATION
Mental retardation is a label applied by society to a relatively
small group of individuals. While this type of labeling may be useful
not only for the individual in question but also for society, it also
has potential negative consequences. There is a tendency to associate
characteristics with labeled individuals that are not inherent in the
definition of the label. Why this is so is not clear but such a
relationship appears to be universal. Much of the research which ex-
plores community attitudes toward the retarded assumes this relationship
exists. These associated characteristics tend to support the erroneous
belief that labeled individuals are similar, in many ways, to one
another and that the differences between these persons and the rest of
society are greater than the similarities.
The present author starts with the assumption that retarded per-
sons are more similar to others than different. Moreover, the author
contends that the variability which is found among the general popu-
lation is usually also present in the retarded population. Such an
orientation demands that differences between the mentally retarded and
others which are not inherent in the definition of retardation must be
demonstrated. Where such differences have not been clearly demonstrated,
the assumption must be that they do not exist.
In order for the reader to obtain a basic understanding of mental
retardation, this chapter first provides a definition of the condition
and includes a discussion of the functions and methods of diagnosis.
The characteristics of the retarded and the causes of this condition
are also explored.
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Of paramount importance in this chapter is a description of the
ability of retarded persons to function independently within the
community and govern their own lives. Since the severity of the
handicap subsumed under mental retardation is variable, the descrip-
tions of these abilities will be made in relation to different degrees
retardation. Finally, research bearing on the incidence of this
condition and its relation to criminal behavior is presented.
Definition and Diagnosis
The most widely accepted definition of mental retardation and the
one accepted by the American Association of Mental Deficiency states
that "Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental period"
(Grossman, 1973, p. 1). As Heber (1962) has pointed out, the concept
of mental retardation emphasizes the present level of functioning of
the individual.
This definition can be divided into three components. First, the
retardation must have originated during the developmental period. The
upper age limit of the developmental period has been specified as
eighteen years (Grossman, 1973, p. 11)* This age limit is believed to
be an aid in discriminating between mental retardation and other
disorders of human behavior. Second, intellectual functioning must be
8significantly subaverage. Intellectual functioning is that which is
measured by intelligence tests, and subaverage defines any test score
which is more than two standard deviations below the mean of the tests.
In general, this is a score of less than seventy. Third, subaverage
intelligence is not sufficient without a concurrent existence of
adaptive behavior deficits. Adaptive behavior means the effectiveness
with which a person meets the standards of personal and social
responsibility expected of his age and cultural group.
The inclusion of adaptive behavior in the definition of mental
retardation is fairly recent and provides several advantages. It
ensures that persons are labeled retarded only when they are not able
to meet the conduct standards established by society. The criterion
of adaptive behavior should enable many persons who score low on
intelligence tests to escape the label of retardation and thus avoid
any of the undesirable effects such labeling creates. Additionally,
intelligence is an abstraction which lacks any agreed-upon definition
or any constellation of tools necessary to measure its components.
Intelligence tests, regardless of their name, were never designed to
evaluate the global concept of intelligence. Rather, these tests
originated with the desire to identify students who were destined
to fail in school. It is likely that problem solving skills differ
between school and other life settings. Therefore, the inclusion of
adaptive behavior provides a check on judgements made solely on the
basis of low intelligence test scores.
The observant reader has probably noted that the definition
supplied by the American Association of Mental Deficiency makes
no
9mention of the irreversibility of the condition. In fact, a consider-
able amount of data exists which demonstrates that intelligence test
scores can and do change oyer time. Clarke and Clarke (1954) tested
and retested with the same instrument a group of individuals who had
been diagnosed as retarded. When a period of two years had passed
between testings the authors found that the mean had risen by 6.5
points. Other researchers have found similar results (New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene, 1955 and Kirk, 1965).
Although mental retardation has a clear definition and, as Bialor
(1970) has pointed out, the definition of emotional disturbance
has proven more elusive due to the diversity of syndromes grouped
under that label, confusion between the two conditions still exists.
For example, Latimer (1970), through interviews with over one thousand
citizens in Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, found considerable confusion
over the purpose of mental health and mental retardation facilities.
At least one-third of the persons interviewed believed that most of
the mentally retarded are mentally ill. A second study by Winthrop
and Taylor (1957) found that sixty-two percent of the subjects believed
mental retardation to be mental illness and forty three percent felt it
could be cured as if it were mental illness.
It is possible that one reason mental illness and mental retard-
ation are viewed similarly is the fact that they both represent deviance.
Every society has established standards of acceptable behavior, and
individuals who habitually violate these standards are labeled deviant.
Such a label usually leads members of society to view the differences
10
between themselves and deviant persons as greater than they actually
are and obscures the similarities. This situation can lead to fear
of the deviant person (Gottlieb & Corman, 1975 and Lewis, 1973) and
eventually, to the sanctioning of the abuse of such persons (Hobbs,
1975a p. 26). Thus, it may be that society views mental illness and
retardation as similar to one another but different from the rest of
society.
The definition of mental retardation can only be made within the
context of a given society. Since deviation as represented by mental
retardation implies a standard set of expectations regarding normal
development (Uzgiris, 1970). A standard set of expectations and the
behaviors which lie outside of that standard can only be defined
within a societal context.
The labeling of a person as mentally retarded can have two pur-
poses. It can first help to identify persons who are in need of re-
medial or special services. This provides help to the individual and
also assists society in preserving its norms and standards. The second
is to identify and separate out the labeled person, again assisting
society, but often at the expense of the individual labeled as deviant.
The labeling of a person as mentally retarded in the United States
usually comes about through a formal diagnosis. The diagnosis as
mentioned in the definition of mental retardation should use intell-
igence test results, an assessment of adaptive behavior, and deter-
minations regarding the age during which the retardation originated.
Unfortunately for society, individuals empowered to label others
as
retarded often use only intelligence testing as criteria,
and many
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individuals are inaccurately labeled as retarded. Even much of the
research regarding the retarded uses this single criterion. The
erroneous practice is so widespread in fact, that unless otherwise
noted, the research cited in this work has primarily used intelligence
tests to make a diagnosis. According to the standard established by
the American Association on Mental Deficiency (Grossman, 1973, p. 17),
a person must manifest deficiencies in both intelligence test scores
and adaptive behavior. A finding of the requisite deficit in intell-
igence testing without the concurrent deficiency in adaptive behavior
does not call for a diagnosis of mental retardation. The converse of
this situation would also not justify a diagnosis of retardation.
Intelligence tests are the most widely used standardized test in
our society, probably because our culture places such a high premium
on performance in academic settings. It has been estimated that over
250,000,000 intelligence tests are administered each year (Hobbs, 1975
a, p. 45). These tests are administered in a variety of settings in-
cluding industry, schools, and the military. A considerable amount of
time and energy is spent in developing new tests and improving old ones.
Although intelligence tests are widely used and accepted in the United
States, they are frequently misunderstood and test results are not
infrequently misinterpreted. For example, it is not unusual to hear
testers interpret an obtained IQ as indicative of innate intellectual
potential or ability. In order to gain a better understanding
of the
meaning of these tests, a brief examination of the history
of taeir
development follows.
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In the early part of the nineteenth century in France there
developed an interest in establishing methods to accurately differen-
tiate between individuals with varying mental abilities. This interest
primarily grew out of the work of Jean Esquirol and Edoward Sequin,
both interested in the remediation of mental retardation (Freeman, 1962,
p. 4). Both men attempted to develop ways of classifying individuals
by degrees of disability, but neither of them was successful. Esquirol
even attempted to make these discriminations on the basis of physical
measurements, particularly the size and shape of the skull. It was
not, however, until the work of Binet that the intelligence test as
we know it today was developed.
During the 1890’s Alfred Binet conducted a considerable amount of
research regarding mental abilities. His research focused on issues
such as memory, imagination, attention, comprehension, and suggesti-
bility. In 1903 the French Minister of Public Instruction approved a
plan which called for the education of children who frequently failed.
The plan called for the removal of these children from regular classes
and their placement in a special school. In order to accomplish this,
a means of identifying the children was needed, and Binet was asked to
develop an instrument which would make the required discrimination. In
collaboration with Simon he undertook the task and designed the intell-
igence test referred to as the Binet-Simon scale (Murphy, 1949, p. 354).
Within this scale there were a series of tests requiring the naming of
objects, comparisons of lengths of lines, the repetition of digits,
the completion of sentences, and the comprehension of questions, i'ne
scale was revised in 1908, and in 1910 it was adapted for use in the
13
United States by Goddard. The test devised by Binet and Simon served
as a model for all the intelligence tests which followed. As a matter
of fact, the Stanford-Binet, the most recent revision of the Binet-
Smon, is one of the most frequently used intelligence tests in the
United States today. What must be kept in mind about these tests is
that they were designed to predict success in a school setting, and,
in. fact, that is where their greatest predictive validity lies. Table
1 presents the correlations that are obtained between the Stanford-
Sinet and grades received in both elementary and high school (Freeman,
1962, p. 215). Other tests which have been developed correlate highly
with the S tanford-Binet . For example, another widely used set of
instruments are the Wechsler scales. The correlation coefficient
between the children’s scale of the Wechsler and the Stanf ord-Binet
is between .64 and .76 (Freeman, 1962, p. 272).
Instruments for measuring adaptive behavior have not received the
attention that intelligence tests have. For many years the Vineland
Scale of Social Maturity (Doll, 1936) was the standard tool used to
make this assessment. This scale consists of one hundred seventeen
items, ordered from least to most difficult, and covered behavioral
areas such as selfhelp, occupation, communication, and socialization.
The information which this scale organizes is not obtained directly
from the individual being evaluated but, rather, from another person
who knows the subject well. The Vineland scale has produced reasonable
reliability coefficients. Doll (1936) reported a coefficient of .92
and Hurst (1962) reported that the reliability was not likely to fall
below .80. Correlations between the Vineland Scale and inrelligence
14
TABLE 1
Correlations between Stanford-Bir.et Scores and School Grades
by Academic Subject
Elementary School High School
Subject Correlation Subject Correlatic
Reading . 60 or higher Reading Comprehension .70
Arithmetic .50 or higher Knowledge of Literature . 60
Spelling .45 or higher English Usage .60
History .60
Algebra .60
Biology .55
Geometry .50
Spelling .45
Reading Rate .45
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test scores have been shown to vary from .41 to .82 (Shakespeare, 1970).
Since the Vineland Scale proved to be unsatisfactory in dis-
criminating between fine differences in adaptive behavior, another
instrument known as the American Association for Mental Deficiancy
Scales of Adaptive Behavior (AAMD Scales) was developed (Nihira,
Foster, Shellhaas, & Leland, 1969). Today, this is the most commonly
U3ed tool to assess adaptive behavior and the one recommended by the
American Association on Mental Deficiency. The project which led to
the development of the AAMD Scales was sponsored by the American
Association on Mental Deficiency and had as its goals: (1) to review
literature in areas related to adaptive behavior, e.g., medicine,
education, sociology, child development, mental retardation, etc.; (2)
to evaluate adaptive behavior as an independent dimension; (3) to develop
a more precise definition of the concept of adaptive behavior; and (4)
to establish a library on adaptive behavior as it relates to mental and
emotional disturbance (Leland, 1973). The scale conceptualizes adaptive
behavior into three behavioral sets. The first, independent functioning,
is the ability of the person to successfully accomplish those tasks or
activities demanded by the critical survival demands of the community
and by the typical community expectations for different ages. Personal
responsibility, the second set, is the willingness of the individual to
accamplish critical tasks he is able to perform and his ability to
assume responsibility for his behavior. The third, social responsi
bility, is the ability to accept responsibility as a community member
and to exhibit behaviors expected by that community. The original
16
AAilD Scale was produced in 1969 and revised in 1974 (Fogelman, 1974).
The scale has a reliability of approximately .62 and appears to have
some validity. For example, it has been shown to discriminate well
between five functionally homogeneous residential units at an institu-
tion for the retarded.
Intelligence tests and adaptive behavior scales not only diagnose
a person as retarded but also classify the person as mildly, moderately,
severely or profoundly retarded. Since these two instruments do not
correlate perfectly there will be times when their diagnoses and
classifications are in agreement and times when they are not. As
mentioned above, the American Association on Mental Deficiency has
stated that both intelligence test scores and adaptive behavior scores
must fall within the retarded range for a parson to be diagnosed as
such. Unfortunately, the association provides no guidelines for class-
ifying retarded persons when these instruments estimate the severity
of retardation differently. If, however, we consider normal intell-
igence or normal adaptive behavior as another classification along a
skill dimension, guidance in making such classification decisions
might be gained. An examination of Table 2 is helpful in this analysis.
In Table 2 X represents a score obtained from either an intelligence test
or an adaptive behavior scale. As shown in the table, there is no
difficulty in classifying individual A. With individual B, however,
the adaptive behavior score indicates normal functioning and the
intelligence test score indicates mild retardation. In these cases the
American Association on Mental Deficiency recommends tnat the higher
17
TABLE 2
An Illustration of Several Different Combinations of Intelligence
Test and Adaptive Behavior Scores
Individual
. A Individual B Individual C
Adaptive Intelligence AB IT AB IT
Classif ication Behavior CAB) TestClT)
Normal X
Mild X X X X
Moderate X
Severe
Profound
18
score be chosen in making a diagnosis. When classifying any retarded
»
it makes sense to follow the association's recommendation
by choosing the higher score and thus, consistency in diagnosis and
classification would be achieved. Therefore, although Individual C
in Table 2 has an adaptive behavior score which indicates moderate
ratardatibn, because his intelligence test score is indicative of mild
retardation, the individual should be classified as mildly retarded.
Characteristics
This section presents information in an attempt to define the
characteristics of the mentally retarded population as a whole.
Particular attention is paid to the relationship of mental retardation
to sex, race, socio-economic class, personality, and adaptive behavior.
The data presented originated either from agency surveys or household
surveys. In the former, agencies that are likely to come in contact
with and provide services for the mentally retarded report the number
of cases they have identified. Household surveys involve investigating
all or a representative sample of the residents in a given geographical
area. In general, agency surveys present lower prevalence rates than
household surveys because all the mentally retarded are not typically
known to agencies, it is difficult to identify all the relevant agencies,
and not all agencies cooperate with research efforts. The last part
of this section provides a very brief discussion of the causes of mental
retardation. The research presented relies on intelligence test scores
for the diagnosis of retardation. Studies that systematically evaluated
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adaptive behavior are identified as such in the work.
In general, researchers have found the incidence of mental
retardation to be higher among males than females. (Lemkaw, Tietze,
& Cooper, 1942, p. 275-288, New York State Department of Mental
H^gience, Mental Health Research Unit, 1965). The proportion of males
to females in these studies is approximately 1.5 to 1. Whether or
not this difference is real or artifactual is unclear. It is possible
that as Lemkaw (1956) has suggested, males are more apt to have their
retardation "discovered" since in our society they are more likely to
get into trouble than are females.
Since the intelligence tests typically administered have been
standardized on white middle class Americans, conclusions regarding
any relationship between mental retardation and race remain cloudy.
A recent study (Conley, 1973, p. 22) investigated the relationship
between mental retardation and socio-economic class for children bet-
ween the ages of five and nineteen. Five classes were identified on
the basis of occupation, income for the head of the household, and
education. This study found that children bom into the lowest class
are thirteen times more likely to be retarded than those bom into the
top three classes. Upon examining the interaction between race and
class, these investigators found that children belonging to the lowest
class are about seven times more likely to be retarded than their
counterparts in the top three classes. Likewise, nonwhite children in
the lowest class are twice as likely to be retarded as nonwhite
children in the top three classes. Within each socio-economic class.
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the prevalence of mental retardation among nonwhite children is higher
than for white children by a multiple of three in the lowest class
and thirteen in the highest three classes. Degree of retardation
was also found to be affected by socio-economic class and race. Those
children with more severe impairments (IQ less than fifty) are seven
times more likely to come from the lowest class than from the highest
three socio-economic classes. Additionally, nonwhites are more likely
than whites to suffer from severe retardation regardless of socio-
economic class, being twice as likely in the lowest class and seven
times more likely in the top three classes.
Very little research has been conducted on the personality
variables associated with mental retardation (Cromwell, 1959). The
interest here, however, is not in thoroughly reviewing this area but,
rather, in focusing on literature which examines the relationship
between emotional disturbance and mental retardation. This decision
is based upon the assumption stated earlier that the retarded are more
similar to than different from the rest of the population. Therefore,
the author believes that, in general, personality development among
the retarded is similar to that of others. But, since the mentally
retarded experience considerable failure within society as it is
currently defined, and since they are frequently ostracized, an
examination of the relationship between emotional disturbance and
mental retardation is warranted.
A number of studies have found the incidence of emotional distur-
bance to be higher among the mentally retarded than would be expected.
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Blatt (1958) found that retarded students in regular or special
classes had a higher frequency of personality maladjustments as com-
pared to other children. Weaver (1946) used eight thousand retarded
military inductees as subjects in an investigation of the adjustment
of the mentally retarded in military service. He found that forty four
percent of the males and thirty eight percent of the females became
psychiatric problems or were repeatedly found guilty of misconduct.
Dewan (1948), studying the emotional adjustment of Canadian mentally
retarded army recruits found that forty seven percent were considered
to be emotionally unstable by psychiatric examination as opposed to
twenty percent in the non-retarded group.
While it is clear that there is a relatively high predisposition
for emotional disturbance among the mentally retarded, the exact
magnitude of this predisposition is difficult to determine (Balthazar
& Stevens, 1975, p. 9). The difficulty is due to the variability in
diagnostic techniques used to determine both mental retardation and
emotional disturbance and additionally, the relative difficulty in
defining and making any diagnoses of emotional disturbance.
A number of researchers have attempted to identify the behaviors
which are associated with mild, moderate, severe, and profound
retardation. The profoundly retarded are persons who need lifelong
care and may even be unable to feed themselves or take care of their
toileting needs (Gunzburg, 1968, p. 27). These persons also require
nursing care, have, at best, primitive speech, and are incapable of
independent functioning (Allen & Allen, 1970, p. 3). The profoundly
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retarded usually have considerable nervous system impairment (Stevens,
1964, p. 4), and other types of handicapping conditions are frequently
present, such as blindness and gross physical anomalies. The American
Association of Mental Deficiency CGrossman, 1973, p. 29) indicates that
a person classified as profoundly retarded by the adaptive behavior
scale is not capable of using all eating utensils and cannot indepen-
dently take care of his dressing or bathing needs.
Severely retarded persons also frequently have considerable central
nervous system damage as well as other handicapping conditions (Stevens,
1964, p. 4). Motor development and language and speech are con-
siderably retarded and these persons need lifelong support and super-
vision (Gunzburg, 1963, p. 27 and Allen & Allen, 1970, p. 3). The
American Association on Mental Deficiency, in categorizing the severely
retarded on the basis of adaptive behavior, states that these persons
cannot totally use all eating utensils, need supervision in bathing,
cannot work competitively, and realize money has value but cannot
make change.
The moderately retarded group represents a dramatic departure from
the severely and profoundly retarded. Moderately retarded persons do
not frequently have neuropathological conditions or other handicapping
conditions (Stevens, 1964, p. 5). These persons can take care of their
bodily needs independently, recognize words, may read, and may make
change (Grossman, 1973, p. 31). According to Stevens (1964, p. 5),
some of these persons may be capable of competitive employment and
independent functioning.
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xb.e most capable group of mentally retarded persons is represented
by the mildly retarded. A mildly retarded person is usually identified
after one or two years in school when he has encountered some trouble.
Generally, this level of retardation is only apparent when engaging
m academic pursuits. These people are usually capable of competitive
employment, and they frequently marry and live independently (Allen
& Allen, 1970, p. 3 Stevens, 1964, p. 6). The mildly retarded can
travel independently, communicate and understand complex verbal
concepts, write letters, and can make change and purchases indepen-
dently (Grossman, 1973, p. 32-33). As Gunzburg (1968, p. 184)
has stated, it could be argued that the mildly retarded have a
sufficient intellectual level for social competence provided their
personality make-up is adequate. Since the "normal" population can be
described the same way, the wisdom of labeling this group retarded at
all is questionable.
From the above, it seems that the mildly retarded and some of the
moderately retarded are capable of independent functioning in the
community. A number of studies which bear on this issue have been
conducted. Investigations by Krishef (1955), Carson (1965), Porter
and Milazzo (1958), Charles (1953), Miller (1965), and Bailer, Charles
and Miller (1967)
,
demonstrate that while; mildly retarded persons
become labeled as such because of school or other problems, these
individuals as adults are typically assimilated into the community
and cease to be identified as retarded by community members. These
persons have assumed a wide range of skilled and semi-skilled jobs and
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have married, raised children and maintained stable and self-sufficient
homes (Cobb, 1972, p. 1).
Kennedy (1966) followed up a group of mildly and moderately
retarded individuals released from a state institution in 1948. The
retarded were compared on a number of dimensions to a group of "normals"
who were matched on several socio-economic variables. Eighteen years
after their release, 86 percent of the retarded and 92 percent of the
controls had married and no significant differences existed for divorce
or separation. Both groups had the same reproduction rate and the
average IQ for the offspring of the retarded group was 99.5 as compared
to 106,6 for the "normals’'. Both groups had the same employment rate
and were rated average by employers and both had the same frequency of
welfare support. The retarded subjects were, of course, a select
group since they were chosen for release from the institution.
Edgerton (1967) identified 110 mildly retarded adults who were
released from a state institution between 1949 and 1958. The object
of Edgerton’s study was to determine how well these individuals were
functioning in the community. Edgerton (p. 142—143) found almost all
of these persons to be functioning adequately. Only a handful had
either gotten into difficulties with the law or exhibited conspicuous
behavior (e.g. excessive drinking) which was in opposition to social
norms.
Coakley (1945) conducted a follow-up study of seventy one retarded
individuals who were released iron an institution for the
retarded into
the community in 1944. The average number of years these
persons had
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been institutionalized was 6.2 with a range of 4,2 to 25.7 years.
The range of IQ's was from 40 to 75. Coakley found that all these
individuals were able to obtain and hold jobs and no relationship
between wages and IQ scores existed. Most of the jobs obtained were
in the unskilled category with several being semi-skilled jobs.
Although many studies have concluded that no relationship exists bet-
ween IQ and wages or ability to hold a job, it should be obvious that
if the full range of intellectual ability were sampled, some sort of
correlation would certainly be found.
Collman and Newlyn Q.956) investigated the employment histories of
two hundred mildly retarded males and females. The histories of the
retarded persons were compared with one hundred six normal IQ individ-
uals. They found a positive relationship between IQ and the ability to
perform skilled work. Sex had no effect on job success across both
groups. Job failures x*ere negligible for both groups and when it did
occur it had the same causes regardless of which group the person was
from. These failures were associated with unstable temperament and
inefficiency on the job. This study brings up an interesting point.
Frequently, retarded persons have the same problems as normal individ-
uals. However, when these problems are exhibited by retarded persons
they are automatically associated with retardation and the response
is frequently to place these persons into institutions. One wonders
why the retarded are not allowed to fail as other people are.
Though the studies above indicate that mildly and many moderately
retarded persons can function adequately within the community, several
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problems exist in interpreting the data. First, all the samples are
biased. For example, samples are frequently taken from groups that
have been released from institutions or graduated from special education
classes. A better method for our purpose would be to randomly sample
all the retarded persons who i^ere born within a particular geographic
area ensuring that socio-economic variables are accurately represented.
Such a sampling procedure would enable us to generalize concerning
the abilities of all retarded persons with a given category. Second,
if a representative sample could be identified, it would be interesting
to explore the ability of persons in mild and moderate categories to
manage their own lives. Examining issues such as employment history
certainly bears on this topic but there are many normal intelligent
persons in the community who have not been able to keep a job, yet
are otherwise able to manage their lives. Third, failure is at times
marked by return to an institution for the retarded. As Saenger (1957)
found, such returns are precipitated by unacceptable behavior such as
property destruction. No one has examined whether or not these persons
should return to the institution or be brought to the attention of
the criminal justice system. What is apparent is that a person labeled
retarded is frequently placed in state schools or other institutions
for the retarded for behavior which can be classified as nuisance or
criminal in nature. Ironically, a person whose tested IQ is only a
few points above the retarded category would receive very different
treatment. Obviously, return to an institution does not
mean that the
individual is incapable of managing his life, although such a mo^e
is
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usually interpreted by society to mean just that.
Incidence
The literature which has examined the incidence of mental retard-
ation has, for the most part, concluded that approximately three per-
cent of the population is retarded. The President's Panel on Mental
Retardation C1962) has stated that three percent of the population
would, if tested, obtain an IQ score below 70. Similarly, the National
Association of Social Workers (1970) has also estimated that three
percent of the population is retarded.
A number of epidemiological studies which used intelligence test
scores as the primary criterion have attempted to determine the pre-
valence of mental retardation in our society. Table 3 summarizes
the results of these studies. The variability of the rates found in
these studies can be explained by a number of factors. One factor
which makes comparisons across studies difficult is the criteria used
by various authors to define retardation. The research conducted by
the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene apparently had no
cutoff point for IQ scores and included persons that various social
service agencies ''suspected" of being mentally retarded. In their
definitions of mental retardation Lemkaw, Tietze, & Cooper (1942) used
an IQ score of less than 70, Levinson (1962) considered an IQ score of
less than 75 as the criterion, and Wishik (1956) used IQ scores of
less than 80.
Another factor creating variability in these results is the age
TABLE 3
Prevalence of Mental Retardation Found by
Studies Using Intelligence as Primary Criterion
Study Place of Study Prevalence
Lemkau, Tietze, &
Cooper (1942)
Baltimore 1.2%
New York State
Department of Mental
Hygiene, Mental Health
Research Unit 0-965)
Onandaga County,
New York
3.5%
Wishik (1956) Oconee and Clark
Counties, Georgia
3.7%
Levinson (1962) Maine 3.2%
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groups surveyed in the research. It is a well known fact that the
prevalence of mental retardation increases steadily with age until
the mid-teens, after which it begins to decline (Conley, 1973
,
p. 18 ).
j.ro.s is primarily due to the fact that most retarded persons do not
get labeled as such until difficulties in school arise, and mildly
retarded persons frequently do not get identified until relatively
late in their school career. As mentioned in a previous section,
mildly retarded persons usually blend into society and lose the label
of retardation upon leaving the educational system. The age range
covered by these studies is as follows: New York State Department of
Mental Hygiene (1965) - one to seventeen; Lemkau, Tietze, and Cooper
(1942) — all ages; Levinson (1962 - five to twenty; Wishik (1956) -
birth to twenty.
The place where the survey was conducted also affects the results.
As demonstrated previously, race and socio-economic class affect
intelligence test scores. It is highly unlikely that these variables
would be similar across the areas shown in Table 3.
An interesting study by Mercer (1973) hypothesized that the pre-
valence of retardation is actually one percent. This hypothesis was
based on the belief that the double criteria recommended by the
American Association on Mental Deficiency (IQ less than 70 and signifi-
cant impairment in adaptive behavior), if consistently applied, would
significantly reduce the number of persons diagnosed as retarded. In
this study, 2,661 households were interviewed in Riverside, California
and 423 persons were identified as possibly being retarded. These
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individuals were tested with the Stanford-Binet or the Kuhlman-Binet
to determine IQ. Additionally, the author conceptualized adaptive
behavior as the ability to play ever more complex roles in a pro-
gressively widening circle of social systems with age. She developed
a scale to measure this concept of adaptive behavior and applied it
to the subjects, taking as a cutoff point on this scale the lowest
three percent in each age group. Table 4 shows the results of this
study when only one criterion (_IQ) is used and the results when both
IQ and adaptive behavior are used. It is obvious from Table 4 that
the combination of IQ and adaptive behavior greatly reduces the inci-
dence of mental retardation and brings it close to a one percent rate.
This reduction is primarily due to a decrease in the number of individ-
uals typically diagnosed as mildly retarded with some reduction
occurring in the moderately retarded group.
The information provided in this study is particularly intriguing
since most studies have indicated that the vast majority of the
retarded are in the mildly retarded group. The New York State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene (1965) found that per one hundred persons, the
mildly retarded had an incidence rate of 1.07 and more severely retarded
persons had a rate of .32. Wishik (1956) found similar results, con-
cluding that mild retardation had an incidence of 1.37 per one hundred
and more severe retardation had a rate of .59. Mercer’s (1973) work
clearly shows that such differences are bound to occur when only IQ
is used to make a diagnosis.
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TABLE 4
Prevalence of Mental Retardation Found by Mercer (1973) in a Community
of 100 Persons When Either the Single Criterion of Intelligence Test
Score is Used on the Double Criteria of Both Intelligence Test and
Adaptive Behavior Scores
IQ
Criteria 0-19 20-49 50-69
IQ 70 .043 .571 1.529
IQ 70 .043 .543 .389
AB 3%
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Causes
Presently, over two hundred known causes of mental retardation
have been identified CConley, 1973, p. 11). Although this figure is
large, most diagnoses cannot identify causal factors with any reasonable
degree of certainty. The causes of mental retardation can be concept-
ualized into the following three categories; heredity; prenatal,
perinatal, and postnatal trauma; and socio-cultural factors (Farber,
1968, p. 6). Currently, it is believed that mild mental retardation
is caused primarily by socio-cultural factors and more severe degrees
of retardation originate from the other two causal categories (Clarke
& Clarke, 1974, p. 49).
Heredity or genetic factors affect mental retardation in two ways.
First, they can lead to abnormal development of the central nervous
system or other systems which affect intelligence. Genetic causes
have been found for Downs syndrome (Stevens, 1964, p. 2) and for
phenylketonuria, a metabolic disorder (Clark & Clarke, 1974, p. 52).
Second, it is believed that the potential for intellectual development
is genetically determined.
There are numerous factors, in addition to genetics, which may
affect the developing fetus or child, including infections and intox-
icants. For example, the contraction by the mother during the first
trimester of pregnancy of German Measles, or lead poisoning, or any
condition causing a shortage of oxygen to the newborn child have all
been shown to cause mental retardation. Tumors can also cause retard-
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ation, and frequently retardation is caused by pathological conditions
of unknown etiology in the brain.
The largest group of mentally retarded persons, however, is com-
posed of individuals in whom there is no indentifiable pathological
condition. Usually classified as mildly mentally retarded, these
persons frequently come from lower socio-economic groups within society.
The exact effects of socio-cultural conditions are difficult to inter-
pret, since they dramatically overlap with the other two causal cat-
egories. Individuals from lower socio-economic groups receive poor
health care compared to others in society. Undoubtedly, pregnant
women in lower socio-economic groups receive inferior prenatal care
and less adequate care during the delivery than others in society.
Young children in this group receive inferior health care of all types
(Butler & Bonnom, 1963). Additionally, these children have a higher
incidence of malnutrition than youngsters in other socio-economic
groups. Lilienfeld and Pasamanick (1955) have demonstrated that
mildly retarded persons may have "minimal" brain damage due to peri-
natal complications. These problems can, of course, be classified
either as prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal, or as socio-cultural
in nature.
Socio-cultural factors also become confused with genetic causes.
It can be demonstrated that intellectual development is related to
socio-economic class. Since it is believed that intellectual potential
is genetically determined one can easily infer that at least some
mildly retarded persons are handicapped because of an inferior
intel-
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lec.tual potential,
Tnere exists a body of information, however, which suggests that
socio-cultural causes other than those mentioned above are critical
in affecting mental retardation. This literature indicates that
persons born with similar potential can develop differently. Klineberg
C194Q) has shown that among U.S. army recruits the average IQ for
blacks was lower than for whites and additionally, blacks from the
north tended to score higher than those from the south. It is easy
to infer that educational opportunities for southern blacks were
inferior to those available to northern blacks. Many studies have
shown that mildly retarded persons from lower socio-economic groups
come from highly impoverished environments (McCandless, 1952, Sarason,
1953). These environments are characterized by extreme poverty,
parental abandonment, social humiliation, rejection and defeat,
parental drunkenness, and parental indifference to the child’s
educational development. Lantz (1954) has demonstrated that failure
experiences tend to prevent a child from taking advantage of practice
that would improve intelligence test performance. It is likely that
life experiences characterized by failure and frustration can have
dramatic impact on intellectual development. Kephart (1940) has
shown that the longer these mildly retarded persons spend in their
home the lower their IQ scores are apt to be. Removal to a situation
where quality residential and educational services could be provided
result in a reversal of this trend in IQ scores.
McCandles (1952, pp. 684-685) has formulated two learning hypo-
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theses to explain socio-cultural retardation. First, the environment
i.o^ these individuals provides a miminum of opportunities to develop
intellectually
, Second, the environment of these persons provides
numerous opportunities for them to learn self-defeating behaviors.
That is, they learn to expect failure and acquire a belief in their
own worthlessness.
Relation to Criminal Behavior
Although factual information concerning the relationship between
mental retardation and criminal behavior is sorely lacking (Harbach,
1976), there have, historically, been an abundance of opinions relating
the two closely. In many cases retarded persons have not even had to
commit a criminal act to be considered criminal. For example, the
Elizabethans regarded paupers and "wandering fools" as criminal
(Haskins & Friel, 1973, Vol. 2). In the beginning of this century a
considerable amount of fear was generated over the threat of mental
retardation, believed to be responsible for all sorts of social
maladies. It was in such as environment that a great number of
theories were generated regarding the criminal tendencies of the
retarded, theories which, seldom supported by facts, have fed the fears
and mistaken beliefs which surround the mentally retarded today.
According to Haskins and Friel (1973, Vol. 2), the theories con-
cerning criminality and mental retardation can be divided into three
groups. Religious theories were based on the concept of original sin.
Physical or genet ic theories stated that criminality was inherent in
the condition of retardation. And Environmental theories assert
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that the retarded are more susceptible to environmental hazards which
breed criminal behavior.
Henderson (1914, p. 101) and Miller (1903, p. 124) stated that
there was a universal relationship between mental retardation and
criminal behavior. This relationship was seen as due to sin and moral
weakness. Mental retardation was seen as divine punishment or state
of being "possessed" brought on by an "abnormal" state of the soul,
usually created by sinful behavior of the parents. These sins could
be drinking, adultery, or even evil thoughts. The theorists did not
consider mental retardation to be a permanent state. Rather, it was
believed that retardation could be "cured" by moral training, hard
work, purity of thought, and forgiveness of the victim and his parents
by God (Miller, 1903, p. 139).
Those ascribing to this avenue of thought believed that mental
retardation could be erradicated through two typ£s of actions. First,
society must abolish its social ills. For example, the temperance
movement had its basis in this philosophical orientation. Second, the
education of prospective parents was urged in order to educate them
regarding moral thoughts and actions. Since "improper thoughts and
actions could lead to a retarded child, this was seen as imperative
(Miller, 1903, p, 131),
Physical or genetic theorists believed that mental retardation
was coupled with criminal traits. Underlying this belief was the
hypothesis that the retarded were less evolved than the rest of
society in relation to intelligence and moral sentiments (SeQuiros,
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1907, p. 42). Other characteristics associated with retardation
were lack of shame and purity, and impulsiveness (Lombroso, mi, p .
365). These characteristics, according to these theorists, could be
repressed by education, and a wholesome environment. This point of
view was influenced by phrenology, which believed that human behavior
is caused by a number of separate functions or characteristics that
were more or less evolved at birth but which also could be further
developed during one's lifetime.
Persons ascribing to an environmental viewpoint held that all
persons can be effected by adverse environmental influences but the
retarded are more vulnerable. The retarded frequently live in undesir-
able settings since they are commonly born to uninterested parents
and disordered homes (Stearns, 1931, p. 25, Goodwin, 1924, p. 13,
Cantor, 1932, p. 117). McCord, McCord, and Zola (1959, p. 73) present
a theory which has an environmental orientation and is more pallatable
in relation to current beliefs. That is, although the retarded have
low intelligence which can be inherited, low intelligence, in and of
itself, is not a cause of criminal behavior. The retarded may turn
towards crime because of two factors. First, conditions in the family
which predispose a person towards crime can affect both the retarded
and normally intelligent persons. Second, retardation has a much
higher frequency in lower socio-economic neighborhoods which also
appear to have a higher incidence of criminal behavior. The retarded
are affected by this environment as are other normally intelligent
people.
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The development of the intelligence test and its arrival in the
United States encouraged many investigators to attempt to prove that
mental retardation was indeed related to criminality. In 1911 (Moore)
it was shown that during an eighteen month period in New Jersey,
forty six percent of all new admissions to the penal system were
retarded. Other early studies reached the same startling conclusion.
That is, large numbers of criminals are mentally retarded (Goddard
and Hill, 1911 and Morrow and Bridgeman 1912). Zeleny (1933), examined
one hundred sixty-three of these early studies and concluded that no
relationship between mental retardation and criminality had been
shown. He found that not only were tests frequently given by un-
trained persons, but also that the criterion for identifying retardation
was commonly a higher IQ score than is currently recommended.
Several recent studies have supplied better information. A research
project for the state of Kentucky (Cull, 1975), had as one of its
objectives to identify and evaluate the adult mentally retarded pop-
ulation living within correctional facilities in Kentucky. Information
was gathered which had previously been produced by the criminal justice
system regarding more than ninety percent of the inmates in Kentucky.
Using an intelligence test score of less than 70 as the criterion,
(these scores were obtained from a variety of instruments) it was found
that 5.2 percent or one hundred twenty two inmates were retarded. Out
of this sample of retarded inmates, three were classified as severely
retarded, twenty six as moderately retarded, and ninety three as mildly
The Correctional Services for the Developmentallv Disabledretarded
.
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(1975), using a methodology similar to Cull, found 27.5 percent of
the inmates of two correctional facilities in Illinois to be retarded.
Brown and Courtless (1958) mailed surveys to two hundred seven
correctional facilities. Eighty four percent of these institutions
replied and supplied data regarding their inmate populations. Using
an intelligence test score of 70 as criterion, these authors concluded
that 9.5 percent of the inmates were retarded. The percentage of the
surveyed population which scored within the moderate retardation
range was 1.6 and several scores even placed persons in the profoundly
retarded category. Studies examining this issue typically gather
information previously generated by penal institutions using both
unqualified persons to administer tests and intelligence tests with
suspect reliability and validity.
Haskins and Fried (1973, Vol, 4), unlike the investigators above,
attempted to establish what percentage of inmates are retarded by
having the Department of Corrections in Texas use qualified persons to
apply the Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a scale widely recognized
as one of the most reliable intelligence tests available. They found
that only five percent of this population was retarded and none of
the individuals scored below the moderate retardation level. The
authors, however, did not conclude that retarded persons are more apt
to commit criminal acts than other persons. They stated that their
data was affected adversely by several problems. First, probation is
dependant upon a steady job, and since the retarded have fewer market-
able skills and thus a greater tendency to be unemployed, they
are
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denied probation more than would otherwise be warranted. This bias
is also strengthened by the fact that fewer community agencies are
willing to serve the retarded and thus, the courts have fewer
alternatives in the case of the retarded offender. These problems
inhibiting retarded offenders from obtaining probation lead to the
existence of a greater proportion of retarded persons being found
incarcerated at a given time than that of other offender groups.
Another issue which Haskins and Friel believe clouds their results
is the fact that the retarded, because of their lower intelligence,
are probably caught and convicted more easily than other offenders.
A number of other issues could also be contributing to the dis-
proportionate number of retarded persons found in prisons by previous
investigators. Earbach (1976) believes this condition exists because
retarded offenders usually receive inadequate counsel since the
client often appears to be noncommunicative and uncooperative to
lawyers, and retarded individuals on trial many times plead quilty
because of a lack of understanding regarding the legal process and
their rights and privileges. Additionally, it should be obvious from
the descriptions provided of the various research efforts that adaptive
behavior has never been used in the assessment of inmates. It is
likely that the incidence of retardation in prisons would be signifi-
cantly reduced if both criteria were used. The studies cited above
appear to be confounded by the variable of socio-economic level. As
was previously shown, the reported higher incidence of retardation
among lower socio-economic classes may be caused by biased intelligence
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tests. It also appears that there is a much higher proportion of
individuals incarcerated within penal institutions who come from
lower socio-economic groups than their numbers in society would
indicate. Unless studies control for the socio-economic levels of the
samples taken, the frequency figures of retardation within these
institutions are bound to remain inflated.
Summary and Conclusions
Mental retardation is defined as subaverage intelligence existing
concurrently with significant deficits in adaptive behavior and
originating during the first eighteen years of life. In order to
diagnose retardation, an assessment of both intellectual ability
and adaptive behavior must be completed. To assess intellectual
ability an intelligence test must be administered. Intelligence
tests can classify retarded persons as mild, moderate, severe, or
profound in their intellectual deficits. The American Association
on Mental Deficiency has recommended that the AAMD Scales be used
to evaluate adaptive behavior and, as with intelligence tests, this
instrument can classify persons as having mild, moderate, severe, or
profound behavioral deficits. This classification is indicative of
the extent of the retardation. Although problems exist with these
instruments, they appear to represent our best method of currently
making this diagnosis.
In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, test results indi-
cating intellectual ability and adaptive behavior must both fall
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within the retarded range. In classifying a person regarding the
severity of retardation, the results of both tests are considered.
When both tests place the individual within the same class (e.g.
moderate), the person is classified in agreement with these test
results. When the tests differ in their results Ce.g. the AAMD
Scale indicates moderate retardation and the intelligence test
indicates severe retardation) the highest classification is to be
used.
Although the American Association on Mental Deficiency recommends
and this work supports a dual criteria for the determination of mental
retardation, in practice this rarely occurs. In studying the research
reports in the field of mental retardation one cannot help but be
amazed at the number of investigations that use only intelligence
test results in making diagnoses. The practice is so common that
only rarely does one encounter the use of dual criteria. Obviously,
this is problematic in interpreting research results.
A considerable amount of literature indicates that mildly retarded
persons can commonly live independently within a community setting.
These individuals can obtain and hold a competitive job, marry, and
buy a home. A fair number of the moderately retarded are also
capable of the same achievements. Although research has not been
conducted which examines the ability of the mildly and moderately
retarded person to make informed life decisions Clack of this ability
indicates the need for a court appointed guardian), it appears that
all the mildly retarded and some of the moderately retarded
do have
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this capability. This conclusion follows from the author’s personal
experience and from the research regarding the ability of the retarded
to function within community defined roles. Although a small number
of mildly retarded persons are not able to obtain jobs and remain
employed, the reader must bear in mind that a small number of persons
who are not retarded have difficulties obtaining and keeping jobs.
This inability obviously does not mean the individual is incapable
of making informed life decisions. Severely and profoundly retarded
persons need guardianship and other protective services as a group.
Although the incidence of retardation in the United States is
commonly held to be three percent, there is reason to believe that
this figure is inaccurate. A great deal of variability is found
across surveys due to data-gathering techniques, reliability of
information, the intelligence test score criteria, the age group
surveyed, and the geographical area where the survey is conducted.
Additionally, Mercer’s 0.973 ) work indicates that the incidence rate
may be closer to one percent. She found this by applying the dual
criteria of adaptive behavior and intellectual ability.
Though it is apparent that retarded persons are incarcerated in
significant numbers within the penal systems in the United States,
the exact number of these persons has not been made clear for two
primary reasons. First, problems with the studies themselves include
the unreliability of data, the inconsistent and ambiguous criteria
used to diagnose retardation, and the lack of any given consideration
to variables such as socio-economic level. Second, there
are biases
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in the administration of the criminal justice sytem that lead to the
upward distortion of the number of retarded persons in prisons. For
example, parole is more difficult for retarded persons and the capture
and conviction of these persons appears to be easier than for other
offenders. It is apparent that the relationship between mental
retardation and criminality, if a relationship exists at all, is
not known.
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C E A P T E R III
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (PRIOR TO M’NAGETEN)
This chapter examines the history of criminal liability before
1843. Since the law regarding criminal responsibility in the United
States is an offspring of English law, most of the literature examined
is British. Although numerous authors have explored this topic, only
a few have made important contributions. The views of Brae ton,
Littleton, Fitzherbert, Coke, Hale, and Erskine (as expressed in the
Hadfield case) are of primary importance. Other less important con-
tributors are also considered, but those mentioned above have estab-
lished the foundations of Anglo-American law on criminal responsibility.
It will become apparent to the reader that these authors frequently
repeated each others ideas in their formulations. This process of
repeating ideas continues into the present and thus, our "modem"
ideas regarding criminal responsibility can usually be traced to very
old philosophies.
Criminal Responsibility
Among ancient peoples a mental disability was regarded as something
to be feared and/or worshipped. Mentally disabled persons were
generally thought to be possessed by spirits. These spirits were
generally considered to be evil; to be possessed by them was fre-
quently seen, therefore, as some sort of punishment. Exorcism, torture
and operations (e.g. trephining) were the standard treatments for this
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condition, designed to drive out or free the spirits.
One of the earliest references to the mentally disabled in formal
law is found in the Twelve Tables of Rome in 449 B.C. (Brakel & Rock,
1971, p. 1). These laws state, "If a person is a fool, let this
person and his goods be under the protection of his family or his
paternal relatives, if he is not under the care of anyone." According
to Roman law, the fact that someone acted significantly different
from other people was sufficient reason for relatives to assume
control of his possessions and person.
In the legal writings of Cicero (106-43 B.C.), mental disability
is not considered as a condition relieving one of criminal liability
(Guttmacher
,
1968, p.23). It was not until the reign of Marcus
Aurelius (A. D. 121-180) that mental disability appears to have become
a concern in criminal matters (Biggs, 1955, p. 47). Marcus Aurelius
is credited with making the statement that madness is its own
punishment. There is little evidence, however, to indicate how this
attitude was manifested in criminal cases of the time.
The Mohammedan law was formed during the seventh century and con-
tains the earliest definite provision that an unintentional killing
by a lunatic or minor was to be considered involuntary homicide
(Biggs, 1955, p. 39), Under this law, such a finding subjected a
defendant only to make religious expiation and monetary compensation,
for which there was a fixed tariff.
The Goths conquered Rome at the end of the fifth century, soon
following with the conquest of Western Europe and Spain, The fall of
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the Roman Empire marks the beginning of the Dark and Middle Ages,
during which periods gains made previously in defining criminal
responsibility for the mentally handicapped were lost. Beliefs
that the mentally disabled were possessed by spirits again dominated
and such persons were frequently murdered or maimed in brutal fashion.
Prior to the beginning of the twelfth century only the criminal
act was necessary for criminal culpability to exist. During the
twelfth century, however, the concept of mens rea or "guilty mind"
was introduced. This concept is extremely important since it under-
lies our criminal law system and is said to justify special treatment
for the insane. It is believed that the term comes from the ancient
maxim, "Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." ("The act itself
does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so") (Bishop,
1882, p, 172). Where this maxim originated is uncertain, however,
sometime between 1100 and 1135 the concept of mens rea was applied
to the crime of perjury in English law, and thereafter the issue of
criminal intent became increasingly important in criminal matters.
Bracton, a priest and head of the highest English court, wrote the
earliest comprehensive treatment of English law in the middle of the
thirteenth century. His writings were heavily influenced by Roman
law, and he is viewed by many as one of the important explicators of
the legal aspects of insanity (Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 509). He is
credited with writing, "Furiosus non intelligit quod agit, et animo
et ratione caret, et non moltum distat a brutes"
- "an insane person is
one who does not know what he is doing, and is lacking in
mind and
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reason, and is not far removed from the brutes” (Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905
p. 510). Two concepts used in tests of criminal responsibility at
various times in the history of criminal law can be traced directly
to Bracton. The first is the knowledge test which still has marked
impact in our legal system. According to this test an insane person
is one who does not know the nature or the quality of the act under
consideration. The second is the wild beast test which has been used
in the past and defines an insane person as one who does not know what
he is doing more than an infant or wild beast would. Since insanity
was not admitted as a defense in criminal matters in England until
the fourteenth century, Bracton probably intended his formula to apply
only in civil matters.
During the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) insanity was considered
sufficient grounds for mitigation of punishment (Biggs, 1955, p. 83),
and although it did not relieve persons from criminal responsibility,
many insane individuals were pardoned after being found guilty.
Insanity began at last to be recognized as a defense during the reign
of Edward II (1307-1321). In 1342 the statute De Prerogative Regis
was passed, (see Glueck, 1966, p. 125 and Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 483),
referring specifically to mentally disordered individuals. It
established the King's jurisdiction over the retarded and the insane,
and made a distinction between insanity and mental retardation. The
retarded were alleged to be born without reason and always to remain
so. The insane were labeled non compos mentis and were seen
as sick
persons who were not born that way and might recover. Legal
confusion
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over these two groups of persons existed early and is evident in this
statute, for another section of it states that a retarded person is not
necessarily so from birth and such a person may enjoy lucid intervals
CBowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p* 483). It is important to note this early
difficulty, since our judicial system frequently demonstrates, even
today, confusion and lack of knowledge concerning the retarded.
During the reign of Edward III (1326-1377) an amorphous group of
persons who suffered from "complete madness" were relieved of criminal
responsibility (Brakel & Rock 1971, p. 376). This represents a major
shift since it established insanity as an entrenched defense within
the English legal system, It is, however, difficult to see how
verdicts in cases using this defense were reached, since a definition
of "complete madness" was not provided.
Sir Thomas de Littleton, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas
in 1466, directed attention towards the civil rights of the insane in
a treatise on the law of England in which he referred to persons who
were not sane as non compos mentis (unsound mind) and then explained
the civil law in relation to such persons (Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 512).
For example, a person was not allowed to plead insanity in civil matters
when property was involved.
A mentally retarded individual was defined by Fitzherbert in the
early sixteenth century as a person who could neither count twenty
pence, tell who his mother or father was, nor how old he was, nor
possessed any understanding of what would be beneficial or detrimental
to himself, (Glueck, 1966, p. 129). Fitzherbert further stated that
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if a man kncws his letters and can read then he is not a "natural fool."
Obviously, there is considerable difference between a person who
cannot count twenty pence, know his age, or know his mother or father
and a person who knows his letters and can read. For some reason the
test requiring the ability to count twenty pence is the only test
ever mentioned in later trials.
Lord Coke, an admirer of Littleton who wrote in the seventeenth
century, did not try to identify the type or intensity of insanity
that could serve as a defense against criminal charges. Rather, he
simply stated that criminal intent or a guilty mind (mens rea ) was
necessary. However, he also stated that non compos mentis is not an
excuse from criminal responsibility in a case of high treason (Coke,
1836 a, p. 405). High treason refers to attempted murder of the
sovereign, and Lord Coke felt that since such an extreme act would
adversly affect everyone in England, it should be dealt with harshly.
This represents an exception to the requirement of guilty mind in
defining criminal responsibility.
According to Coke, "in criminal causes, as felony, . . . the act and
wrong of a madman shall not be imputed to him... for in these causes he
is...without his mind or discretion j and... a madman is only punished
by his madness. And so it is of an infant, until he be of the age
of fourteen, which in law is accounted the age of discretion." Coke’s
statement that "a madman is only punished by his madness" was frequently
quoted in later cases.
Coke used non compos mentis as a generic term and divided in
into
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four types; (a) idiots who are born with a permanent handicap render-
ing them non compos mentis ; (b) people who, through accident, illness,
or grief, lose their memory and understanding; (c) lunatics who
sometimes possess understanding and sometimes do not; Cd) a person
who is drunk (Coke, 1836 b, p. 247).
According to Lord Coke, no person who fits into the first two
categories could be held criminally responsible. In the third category,
a person was exempt from criminal responsibility if, at the time of
the act, he lacked memory or understanding. It is interesting to note
that Coke made no mention of the knowledge of right and wrong. Instead,
Coke felt the person who was non compos mentis was incapable of criminal
intent and therefore, should be relieved of criminal responsibility.
Since the fourth type specified by coke—a person who is non compos
mentis is directly responsible for his own state, Coke felt that he
should not be relieved of responsibility. Coke apparently believed
that no test for criminal responsibility was necessary. These ideas
became part of the law of England through the Beverley case (Glueck,
1966, p. 130).
Lord Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1671-1676),
exerted considerable influence on later judicial opinions and made
the concept of criminal intent or guilty mind his starting point in
dealing with mental disability cases. He was the first writer to
distinguish between insanity which would and would not excuse a person
from criminal responsibility (Hale, 1847, pp. 29-37). Lord Hale
assumed that criminal intent was intimately related to the defense
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of insanity. He attempted to deal with this problem by first categoriz-
ing the types of mental handicap and used the term "dementia" to
refer to these. Hale identified three types of dementia:
1. Idiocy "...such a one is described by Fitzherber, who knows
not to tell 20’s, nor knows who is his father or mother, nor knows his
own age; but if he knows letters, or can read by the instruction of
another, then he is no idiot,.. These, though they may be evidences,
yet they are too narrow, and conclude not always, for idiocy or not is
a question of fact triable by jury, and sometimes by inspection."
It is interesting to note that this last sentence of Hale’s has been
generally ignored. Hale appears to be saying that no single test
can adequately determine criminal responsibility, and that these tests
are merely evidences, and that it is the jury, as a fact-finding body,
which must determine whether or not a person is to be defined as an
idiot.
2. Dementia accidentalis vel adventitia caused by an accident or
illness. This type can further be divided into "partial insanity" and
"total insanity." "Partial insanity" refers to persons that either
possess a competent use of reason in respect to some subjects but are
under a particular dementia in respect to other subjects, or those
whose dementia is of such a degree that it interferes little with the
use of reason. Hale stated that partial insanity could excuse a person
from criminal responsibility but that such cases would be rare since
most persons who commie felonies are suffering from a degree of partial
insanity when they commit the offenses. He recognized the difficulty
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in drawing the line between partial and total insanity. "Total insan-
ity" is defined as a total inability to reason. He proposed the
following to determine when a person is "totally insane:" When a
person does not have "as great understanding, as ordinarily a child
of fourteen years hath," then that person can be considered totally
insane and not criminally responsible. This follows from the fact
that at that time, in England, children under fourteen years of age
were not criminally responsible, and Hale believed that children
under fourteen could not distinguish between good and evil. This was
the first time moral knowledge had been presented as a test for
insanity. Again, however, the jury was left to make the ultimate
determination.
3. Dementia affectata—drunkenness. Hale concluded that these
persons are criminally responsible.
In summary, although Hale seemed to say that no test can be con-
clusive, he suggested two tests himself. First, he recommended Fit-
zHerberts* test for idiocy. Second, he suggested that the intelligence
of a fourteen year old child be used as criterion for discriminating
between partial and total dementia. He implied that the ability to
discriminate between good and evil is a criterion. Hale apparently
felt that the mere fact of mental illness was not sufficient in itself
to relieve a person of criminal responsibility.
In 1724 Edward Arnold was tried for shooting at Lord Onslow
under
the delusion that Lord Onslow had injured him. During the trial, Judge
Tracy* s instructions to the jury were based upon ideas put forward by
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previous writers and contained the following: "it is not every kind
of frantic human or something unaccountable in a man’s actions, that
points him out to be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that
is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not
know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a
wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment; therefore,
1 must leave it to your consideration, whether the condition this man
was in, as it is represented to you on one side, or the other, doth
shew a man who knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish
whether he was doing tood or evil, and understood what he did"
(Weinhofen, 1954, p. 56). This is clearly a combination of Hale’s
fourteen-year-old test and Bracton’s "wild beast" theory.
Isaac Ray, writing in 1838 (1962, p. 22), described the Arnold
case as follows:
Arnold seems to have been of weak understanding from his
birth and to have led an idle, irregular, and disordered
life, sometimes unequivocally mad and at all times considered
exceedingly strange and different from other people; one
witness describing him as a strange, sullen boy at school,
such as he had never seen before. It was testified by his
family and his neighbors that for several years previous they
had considered and treated him as mad, occassionally if not
always, although so little disposed to mischief, that he was
suffered to be at large. Contrary to the wishes of his friends,
he persisted in living alone in a house destitute of the
ordinary conveniences; was in the habit of lying about in bars
and under hayricks; would curse and swear to himself for hours;
laugh and throw things about the house without any cause what-
ever, and was much disturbed in his sleep by fancied noises.
Among other unfounded notions, he believed that Lord Onslow,
who lived in his neighborhood, was the cause of all the tumults,
disturbances and wicked devices that happened in the country,
and his thoughts were greatly occupied with this person. He
was in the habit of declaring that Lord Onslow sent his devils
and imp.** into his room at night to disturb his rest and that
he constantly plagued and bewitched him. by getting
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into his belly or bosom, so that he could neither eat, drink,
nor sleep.,., he declared in prison it was better to die
than live so miserably and manifested no compunction for
what he had done. Under the influence of these delusions,
he shot at and wounded Lord Onslow. The proof of insanity
was strong enough, but not that degree of it which the
jury considered sufficient to save him from the gallows,
and he was accordingly sentenced to be hung.
It we carefully analyze Judge Tracy's instructions we will find that
he told the jury to use practically every test that had been proposed
up until this time. First, he stated that persons who are not criminally
responsible do not know what they are doing. Second, he mentioned a
total deprivation of memory and understanding. Third, this lack of
memory and understanding had to be similar to a brute, wild beast, or
infant. (Here, it appears that Judge Tracy saw the mind of an infant
to be similar to that of a brute or wild beast.) Fourth, he stated
that persons relieved of responsibility must not be able to distinguish
between good and evil. It appears that the Judge attempted to utilize
all the ideas which had been written prior to this trial. Judge Tracy's
tendency to call upon all previous formulations may certainly be in-
dicative of confusion over how to proceed.
The Arnold case is frequently cited as exemplifying the use of
the "wild beast test” (see Glueck, 1966, p. 139). Why the other test
used in this case is ignored is not clear; however, it is apparent
that once a test becomes associated strongly with a case, however
erroneously, the test and the case tend to be cited as precedent.
The next case of importance is that of Earl Ferrer, an English
nobleman, tried for the murder of his steward in 1760. The
importance
56
of this case stems from the directions the Solicitor-General for the
Crown gave to the jury. The Solicitor-General's address to the jury
summarized Hale as follows (quoted from Glueck, 1966, p. 142):
...The result of the whole reasoning of this wise judge and
great lawyer (jso far as it is immediately relative to the
present and purpose) stands thus. If there be a total want
• of reason, it will acquit the prisoner. If there be a total
temporary want of it, when the offense was committed, it will
acquit the prisoner; but if there be only a partial degree
of insanity, mixed with a partial degree of reason; not a
full and complete use of reason, but (as Lord Hale carefully
and emphatically expresses himself) a competent use of it,
sufficient to have restrained those passions, which produced
the crime; if there be thought and design; and faculty to
distinguish the nature of actions; to discern the difference
between moral good and evil; then, upon the fact of the offense
proved, the judgement of the law must take place.
...The question therefore must be asked; is the noble prisoner
at the bar to be acquitted from the guilt of murder, on account
of insanity? ...Was he under the power of it, at the time of
the offense committed? Could he, did he, at the time, dis-
tinguish between good and evil? The same evidence, which
established the fact, proves, at the same time, the capacity
and intention of the noble prisoner. Did he weigh the motives?
Did he proceed with deliberation? Did he know the consequences?
The right-and-wrong test contained in the Earl Ferrer case is today
the most universally used test in American cases where the question of
insanity is raised. Since judicial law is heavily dependent upon pre-
cedent, judges have tended to use the test uncritically and regardless
of the inconsistencies between it and the theoretical foundation for
criminal law, mens rea , which clearly involves much more than moral
knowledge. The case is also notable as one of the earliest in which
a physician was called to testify as an expert witness.
Hawkins (1824, p. 1), writing in the late eighteenth century,
stated that guilt regarding lawbreaking supposes deliberate disobedience
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to the law. Such guilt can never be imputed to persons who are either
incapable of understanding the law or of conforming themselves to it.
Individuals who are relieved of responsibility are those who either
lack reason or are under the power of others.
Hawkins (p* 2) advocated as a test the ability to distinguish
between good and evil. Infants under the age of discretion, "lunatics,"
and "idiots" were seen as unable to make this discrimination. Hawkins
Viewed "idiots" as lacking understanding from birth and used Fitzher-
bert r s definition for retardation. "Lunatics" were defined as persons
who are mad.
Hawkins obviously felt that persons using insanity as a defense
were dangerous since he advocated "strict custody in such a place
and manner as the court sees fit" in cases where a person charged
with a felony is found not guilty due to insanity. Disagreeing with
Lord Coke, Hawkins (p. 3) felt that, even in cases of High Treason, a
person can be relieved of responsibility.
Hawkins* writings display confusion. He first states that persons
who are incapable of understanding the law or of conforming to it are
relieved of responsibility and then advocates the ability to discrimin-
ate between good and evil as a test. Obviously, knowledge concerning
law is different from moral knowledge, and the ability to conform to
law is not reflected in moral knowledge.
In 1800 one of the most important cases occurred, the Hadfield
case. Erskine, the defense attorney, attacked the right-and-wrong test
on both medical and legal grounds. Hadfield was a veteran of the French
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wars CGuttmacher, 1968, p, 24) and had received a sword wound in the
brain. He was placed on trial for attempting to shoot the King,
George III, He believed that God was guiding him and that he had a
holy mission to sacrifice himself for the salvation of the world.
By killing the king he believed that the state would execute him and
therefore assist him in his martyrdom.
Erskine faced the task of defending Hadfield on the basis of
insanity with only the definitions of Coke and Hale as precedent. He
decided to attack their definitions, and he proposed that "delusional
insanity" define criminal responsibility. There is no record of this
argument before that time (Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 527). Erskine’s
speech first refuted the doctrines of Coke and Hale with the following
words (Glueck, 1966, p, 144);
The Attorney-general, standing undoubtedly upon the most
revered authorities of the law, has laid it down, that to
protect a man from criminal responsibility
,
there must be
a total deprivation of memory and understanding. I admit
that his is the very expression used both by Lord Coke
and Lord Hale; but the true interpretation of it deserves
the utmost attention and consideration of the court. If
a total deprivation of memory was intended by these great
lawyers to be taken in the literal sense of the words:
If it was meant, that, to protect a man from punishment,
he must be in such a state of prostrated intelligence,
as not to know his name, nor his condition, nor his
relation toward others - that if a husband should not
know he was married; or, if a father, could not remember
that he had children; nor know the road to his house,
nor his property in it - then no such madness ever existed
in the world. It is idiocy alone with places a man in
this helpless condition. .. .But in all the cases which have
filled Westminster Hall with the most complicated consider-
ations - the lunatics and other insane persons who have
been the subjects of them, have not only had memory in my
sense of the expression - they have not only had the most
perfect knowledge and recollection of all the relations they
59
stood in toward others, and of the acts and circumstances
of their lives, but have, in general, been remarkable for
subtlety and acuteness. Defects in their reasonings have
seldom been traceable - the disease consisting in the
delusive sources of thought; all their deductions within
the scope of the malady, being founded upon immoveable
assumptions of matters as realities
, either without any
foundation whatsoever, or so distorted and disfigured by
fancy as to be almost nearly the same thing as their
creation.
Instead of using the absence of intellectual faculties as the
basis of determining criminal responsibility, Erskine proposed that
the presence of delusions be used.
Erskine summarized his views as follows CGlueck, 1966, p. 147):
Delusion, therefore, where there is no frenzy or raving
madness, is the true character of insanity .... In civil
cases... the law avoids every act of the lunatic during the
period of the lunacy; although the delusion may be ex-
tremely circumscribed; although the mind may be quite
sound in all that is not with the shades of the very
partial eclipse; and although the act to be avoided can
in no way be connected with the influence of the insanity;
- but to deliver a lunatic from responsibility to
criminal justice, above all, in a case of such atrocity as
the present, the relation between the disease and the act
should be apparent. Where the connection is doubtful,
the judgement should certainly be most indulgent, from the
great difficulty of diving into the secret sources of the
disordered mind; but still, I think, that, as a doctrine
of law, the delusion and the act should be connected.
Although the trial was far from over when Erskine delivered his
speech, the court practically ordered an acquittal of Hadfield and
the case was won.
Glueck (1925, p. 148) has pointed out that this case is interesting
in that it sheds light on the development of law. Erskine proposed a
definition of criminal responsibility that had no precedent in lew and
further, ran counter to definitions then in effect. Nevertheless, it
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was accepted by the court and literally written into law (Bowlby &
Lloyd, 1905, p. 529). The case contradicts the popular belief that
judicial decisions must be based upon law and precedent and that
somehow the theory underlying the law makes all elements consistent
with one other.
Another important case occurred when Bellingham shot and killed
the First Lord of the Treasury in 1812 (see Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905,
p, 532). Believing that the government owed him about $500,000, he
attempted to collect it by appealing to cabinet ministers and Parlia-
ment. Though in fact, no such claim existed against the government,
Bellingham attempted to enlist the aid of the First Lord of the
Treasury, and finding him uncooperative, shot and killed him.
Although this case is similar to Hadfield’s, the judge rejected
Erskine's position regarding criminal responsibility, and the jury
was instructed to use the right and wrong test in deciding the guilt
or innocence of Bellingham. The interpretation of this test was
very narrow in that only if the defendant was totally deprived of the
power of reasoning could he be excused from responsibility. Bowlby
and Lloyd 0-905, p. 532) have stated that according to the Bellingham
case "there can be no such thing as criminal insanity; the only
irresponsible man is he who has so completely lost his power of
reasoning that he is not able to entertain an intention to do anything.
In other words, an insane man becomes exempt from punishment only when
he becomes so insane as not to be able to commit an intentional act.
Since this represents a reversal of the delusion doctrine which
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relieved Hadfield of responsibility twelve years earlier, it is helpful
to understand how such decisions occur. Glueck (1925, p. 149, footnote)
presents information which indicates that this interpretation was not
due to examination of law, knowledge concerning the insane, or a
consideration of theory, but rather was based on factors such as the
emotional reaction of the judge or those of society as a whole. When
Bellingham committed his crime there was a great public outcry as the
First Lord was very popular. Although it was customary to allow fif-
teen days between the date of the offense and the date of arraignment,
Bellingham was arraigned after only four days. His counsel pleaded
for postponement saying, n I never saw the prisoner before, and it
has not been in our power to bring forth all the evidence to prove
whether he be sane or insane." Further, in addition to the instruc-
tions above, the judge informed the jury that the people as a whole
would suffer from the victim’s untimely death and gave considerable
praise to the First Lord. Xt appears likely that the Judge’s behavior
was directed towards obtaining a conviction. And again, this was a
precedent setting case.
Two other trials were held in England in 1812: Parker’s Case and
Bowler’s Case (sae Biggs, 1966, p. 92). In those cases juries were
instructed to use both the right-and-wrong test and the delusion test.
The instructions stated that "...it was for them to determine whether
Che prisoner when he committed the of f ense. . .was or was not incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong, or under the influence of any
illusion which rendered his mind at the moment insensible of the
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nature of the act he was about to commit, since in that case he would
not be legally responsible for his conduct.” Thus, the delusion
doctrine was again being used in English courts.
At that time in American history the courts were following the
precedents provided by English law. However, two American cases are
worth noting. The first is the Richard P. Clark case heard in 1816.
Clark was charged with petty larceny for stealing $7.50 worth of
property. In its instructions the jury was told that, "...such was
the humanity of law, that no man could be held responsible for an
act committed while deprived of his reason; and that a madman was
generally considered, in law, incapable of committing a crime. But
it is not every degree of madness or insanity, which abridges the
responsibility attached to the commission cf crime. In that species
of madness where the prisoner has lucid intervals; if during those
intervals, and when capable of distinguishing good from evil, he
perpetuates an offense, he is responsible. The principal subject of
inquiry, therefore, in this case, is whether the prisoner, at the time
he committed this offense, had sufficient capacity to discern good
from evil. Should the jury believe he had such capacity, it will be
their duty to find him guilty."
The critical issue here was whether or not the accused had moral
knowledge, apparently the only question considered to be of worth. It
was also held that mentally disabled persons who have lucid intervals
are responsible for criminal acts during those intervals.
The second case involved John Ball, tried in 1817 for arson. He
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was known as a person frequently intoxicated and abusive to his
children and his wife, who had been planning a separation. With the
apparent motive of revenge expressed to a number of acquaintances
Ball set fire to his house with, his wife, family, tenants, and himself
inside. Fortunately, the fire was quickly extinguished, and Ball
was found hiding under the bed in his room. With a razor which was
tound near him, he had cut his throat (though not fatally). On being
drawn out from under the bed he attempted to tear open his bleeding
wounds and shouted that "if it had been only a half hour longer, I
should have had my revenge." Although he was frequently intoxicated,
he was not in that state on the day of the fire and numerous witnesses
testified that the defendant was sane. But the defense attorney took
the position that the act was so terrible that it indicated an insane
defendant.
The jury was instructed that "...if they believed the defendant,
actuated by revenge or through despair, committed this act, it would
be their duty to find him guilty. It did not necessarily follow, as
had been contended on behalf of the defendant that the act of which
he had been charged was the result of insanity, because, from its
nature, it was horrid and unnatural. The only question on this part
of the case is, whether, at the time he committed the offense, he was
capable of distinguishing good from evil." This case supported moral
knowledge as the discriminating condition and refused to accept the
"unusualness" of the act as evidence of insanity. This refusal con-
tinues to exist in our judicial system.
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In .1831 Offord was indicted in England for shooting and killing
Cfr^-Snall (see Biggs, 1955, p. 93). Offord, suffering from the delusion
that the inhabitants of his town were attempting to deprive him of his
liberty and life by issuing warrants against him, carried a list
of 40 or 50 names of persons he believed were plotting against him,
Chisnall among them. The jury was instructed that before they could
relieve Offord of responsibility they must be satisfied that "he did
not know, when he committed the act, what the effect of it, if fatal,
would be, with reference to the crime of murder. The question was,
did he know that he was committing an offense against the laws of God
and nature?" Obviously this test requires the jury to look at both
legal and moral knowledge. It is interesting to note that both
Bellingham and Offord exhibited similar behaviors and the juries re-
ceived similar instructions. However, Bellingham was convicted and
executed and Offord was acquitted on the basis of insanity.
Unlike the tests mentioned above, the irresistible-impulse doctrine
originated in the United States in 1834 with the State v. Thompson
case (1834) . During the trial the jury was told that the defendant
was responsible if at the time of the act he could distinguish between
right and wrong, was aware of the wrongfulness of the act and had the
power to perform or not perform the act. In this case the right-and-
wrong test was expressed somewhat differently, for the defendant
not
only was required to be able to distinguish between good and
evil at
the time of the act but also to know that the act itself was
wrong.
Further, if the defendant appeared to have been unable to
control his
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his behavior, he was not to be considered responsible.
In 1840, Oxford, who was mentally unsound, attempted to kill
Queen Victoria by firing a gun at her (see Glueck, 1925, p. 152). The
jury was instructed to relieve the defendant of responsibility" if
some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within him,
which he could not resist. The question is whether the prisoner was
laboring under that species of insanity which satisfies you that he
was quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences of the
act he was committing, or, in other words, whether he was under the
influence of a diseased mind, and was really unconscious at the time
he was committing the act, that it was a crime." This appears to ask
for knowledge concerning the physical act, morals, and law. At
another point the jury was told that, "Upon the whole, the question will
be, whether all that has been proved about the prisoner at the bar
shows that he was insane at the time when the act was done — whether
the evidence given proves a disease in the mind as of a person quite
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong...
V
Several points were introduced here for the first time. First,
the irresistible-impulse test which had appeared in American courts
is suggested by the phrase ’’which he could not resist." Second, the
nature, character, and consequences of the act" is used as a test.
This test is used in many subsequent cases where it is set
down side
by side with or confused with the right-and-wrong test
(Glueck, 1925,
p. 153). Furthermore, the right-and-wrong test
was given as an
illustration in this case of one possib le symptom of
individuals who
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should be relieved of criminal responsibility.
Summary and Conclusions
A number of conclusions are indicated by the preceding case
histories. First, prior to 1843 much of contemporary doctrine con-
cerning criminal responsibility was formed. The development of this
doctrine was heavily dependent on the rather arbitrary circumstances
of who happened to be writing on the subject or to occupy a particularly
Visible judicial position. Judges chose to accept some parts of pre-
cedent-setting definitions and reject others, and the rationale
behind these decisions appears to have been at times personal and
social rather than legal, moral, and theoretical.
Second, while some efforts were made to distinguish between the
retarded and other types of offenders in defining criminal respon-
sibility, these efforts were infrequent and sporadic. Much of the
difficulty today in discriminating legally between the retarded and
the mentally ill has its roots in these early historic confusions.
Since mentally ill and retarded individuals have different constell-
ations of problematic behavior, the inability to define these groups
legally has undoubtedly added to the problems of defining criminal
responsibility.
Third, this period saw a move from strict liability for
aci_s
(before the twelfth century) to the recognition that certain
persons
are exempt from criminal responsibility. Exceptions
were defxned
tests and should, at least theoretically, have
been
by the various
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based on the concept of mens rea . Again, writers and judges tended
to choose elements of mens rea as tests and ignore other aspects.
There is no evidence to indicate that anyone attempted to apply all
the aspects of mens rea in defining responsibility.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (FROM M'NAGHTEN TO THE PRESENT)
This chapter completes the examination of the history of criminal
responsibility, beginning in 1843 with the M’Naghten rules, the
single most influential happening in this history. Next under
scrutiny is the irresistible-impulse rule, the product rule, the
model penal code and Vermont rule, and finally, the abolition of
the defense of insanity.
The M'Naghten Rules
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten, laboring under the unfounded belief
that Prime Minister Robert Peel had injured him, shot and killed
Edward Drummond, mistaking him for Peel.
During M’Naghten’ s trial Q.843) the jury was instructed to
determine "...whether at the time the act in question was committed,
the prisoner had or had not the use of his understanding, so as to
know that he was doing a wrong or wicked act. If the jurors should
be of the opinion that the prisoner was not sensible, at the time
he committed it, that he was violating the laws both of God and man,
then he would be entitled to a verdict in his favor; but if, on the
contrary, they were of the opinion that when he committed the act he
was in a sound state of mind, then their verdict must be against him."
Essentially, these instructions were the knowledge test. The jury
was to judge whether or not M’Naghten had knowledge regarding morals
and the law of the land at the time the offense was committed. This
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knowledge had to be specific to the act committed. The jury found
M Naghten not guilty on the ground of insanity.
The verdict raised an uproar in England (see Glueck, 1966, p. 162)
since at that time attacks upon English officials had been numerous,
and unrest and violence were common. Thus, the House of Lords was
concerned over the verdict enough to address a series of probing
questions to the judges who had tried the case. Because of the extreme
importance of this case the questions asked and the answers supplied
by the judges are presented verbatim CM’Naghten, 1843).
Question 1 - What is the law respecting alleged crimes
committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in
respect of one or more particular subjects or persons, as,
for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to
law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the
influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging
some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing supposed
public benefit?
Answer 1 - Assuming that your Lordships’ inquiries are
confined to those persons who labour under such partial
delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we
are of opinion that, notwithstanding the accused did the
act complained of with a view, under the influence of
insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed
grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit,
he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature
of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing
such crime that he was acting contrary to law by which
expression we understand your Lordships to mean the law of
the land.
Question 2 - What are the proper questions to be submitted to
the jury when a person afflicted with insane delusions
respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is
charged with the commission of a crime (murder for instance)
,
and insanity is set up as a defense?
Question 3 - In what terms ought the question to be left to
the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when
the act was committed?
Answers 2 and 3 - As these two questions appear to us to be
more conveniently answered together, we submit our opinion
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to be that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every
man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved to their satisfaction. That, to establish
a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of committing that act the accused
was loboring under such a defect of reason from disease of
the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, or did not know he was doing what was wrong.
The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the
jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the
accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference
betxjeen right and wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever,
leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, we conceive,
so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party’s knowledge of right
and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is
charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge
of the accused, solely and exclusively with reference to
the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury by
inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the
law of the land was essential in order to lead to a
conviction; whereas the law is administered on the principle
that every one must be taken conclusively to know it with-
out proof that he does know it. If the accused was con-
scious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and
if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of
the land, he is punishable, and the usual course therefore
has been to leave the question to the jury,whether the
accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know he was
doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think is
correct, accompanied with such observations and corrections
as the circumstances of each particular case may require.
Question 4 - If a person under an insane delusion as to
existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof, is
he thereby excused?
Answer 4 - The answer must of course depend on the nature
of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did
before, namely, that he labours under such partial delusion
only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility
as if the facts with respect to which the delusions exist
were real. For example, if under the influence of his de-
lusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting
to take away his life, and ha kills that man, as he supposes
in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If
his
delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury
to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge
for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.
71
Question 5 - Can a medical man conversant with the disease
of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the
trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the
examination of all witnesses, be asked his opinion as to
the state of the prisoners' mind at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was
conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting
contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any and
what delusion at the time?
Answer 5 - In answer thereto, we state to your Lordships,
that we think the medical man, under the circumstances
supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the
terms above stated, because each of those questions involves
the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to,
which it is for the jury to decide, and the questions are
not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case
such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are
admitted or not disputed, and the question becomes
substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to
allow the question to be put in that general form, though
the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right.
These answers emphasized a number of points. First, to be
criminally responsible, a person must know the nature and quality of
an act when the act is performed. However, exactly what is meant
by the "nature and quality" is not clear. Second, a person must
have knowledge of right and wrong concerning an act at the relevant
time. This knowledge refers to both legal and moral knowledge. Since
the judges indicated that, in general, juries should be asked to
decide criminal responsibility on the basis of knowledge of right and
wrong, the first point becomes relatively unimportant and the
M Naghten
rules are simply a restatement of the knowledge test.
Third, only
juries have the right to make decisions regarding criminal respon-
sibility, and physicians are firmly established as expert
witnesses
in trials where the sanity of the defendant is
in question.
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These answers have become a part of the fabric of American law.
Before looking at their expression in American law we will examine
the criticisms which the M'Naghten rules have raised, criticisms
primarily concerned with the result of the application of these
rules. That is, how do these rules affect the decisions which juries
iaake and how well do these effects fit with a particular critic's
ideas concerning justice.
Since the answers which defined criminal irresponsibility were
responses to questions concerning persons who were suffering from
insane delusions, it is apparent that the M'Naghten rules were
formulated for individuals who are considered mentally ill and not
for the mentally retarded. Furthermore, because the questions and
answers focus on persons suffering from delusions, they do not
address other behaviors associated with mental illness. Therefore, it
is likely that the judges never intended that these rules apply to
all cases where criminal responsibility is in question. It should
be kept in mind that these judges were under considerable pressure to
explain their actions to persons who believed that a miscarriage
of justice had occurred. The stress they felt is apparent in the
judge's expressed regret that the questions were not argued by counsel
rather than being answered by them (M'Naghten, 1843). Obviously,
the judges were uncomfortable with their position and would naturally
have preferred not to have been required to justify their decisions
in court. The answers supplied are merely a conglomeration of previous
ideas, offering little or nothing which extends or improves upon
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these ideas.
The M’Naghten rules have been severely criticized by numerous
authors (e.g. Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905 p. 544 ; Hall, 1960, p. 519;
Fitzgerald, 1962, p. 153). Sir James Stephen (1883) writing forty
years after the case, voiced criticisms of M’Naghten which are
frequently echoed today. According to Sir Stephen, (Vol. II, p. 154)
,
a judge himself, the answers provided by the M’Naghten case do not
deal with many of the issues involved and in fact tend to confuse
juries. Further, Stephen states that the M’Naghten rules were never
meant for general adoption by courts and in fact, the answers given
were designed primarily with an interest in justifying the behavior
of the judges in the M’Naghten case (see Biggs, 1955, p. 108). In
addition, it is apparent from the statement at the end of the third
answer, ’’...and this course we think is correct, accompanied with
such observations and corrections as the circumstances of each
particular case may require," that the judges did not mean these
rules to apply to all circumstances.
Another criticism leveled by Stephen (p. 155) is that according
to M’Naghten isanity is regarded simply as a case of innocent ignorance
or mistake, failing to recognize the effects this condition can have
on the emotions and will. This criticism has been much voiced, in
one form or another. Fitzgerald (1962, p. 135) criticized M’Naghten
for the emphasis on reason and the entire disregard of emotion.
Biggs
(1955, p. 109) feels that M’Naghten is misleading since it
examines
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only one variable in determining criminal responsibility. It is
interesting to note, however, that although many individuals have
iticiz,ed these rules, the literature of law contains almost no
discussions of the problems which M’Naghten created by making no
distinction between mental illness and mental retardation.
While Stephen (p. 154) has serious questions regarding the M’Naghten
Rules, he nevertheless recommends the judges follow these rules until
...some more binding authority is provided, especially as the practice
has now obtained since 1843.” Stephen, as a prominent judge, obviously
was in a position to affect England’s laws regarding insanity and yet
he refused to take the initiative, preferring to rely on precedent.
This behavior exemplifies what seems to me to be a major problem with
criminal law in general. That is because judges are expected to rely
on precedent, they avoid initiating significant changes even when they
believe that justice would be better served by the change. While
stability is certainly necessary in law, this over-strong emphasis on
precedent makes any change very difficult to achieve.
The M’Naghten rules appear to be based upon phrenological concepts.
That is, each function is considered to be directed by a different
faculty of the brain. Within this theoretical framework it is very
possible for the moral faculty to be affected by insanity while the
conative—emotional aspects of the individual remain 'normal.
Another frequently named objection to M’Naghten is that because
of its subjectivity, it is extremely difficult for juries to interpret
(see Eowlby & lloyd, 1905, p. 550). These critics demand a more
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objective "yardstick" approach for objectively measuring a defendant’s
responsibility. Such criticism appears to me to have little value
since such decisions are by their very nature subjective. The pri-
mary need is for legal definitions and tests which enable society to
recognise the intent of the criminal law and increase its ability to
identify those who should not be held responsible. In the final
analysis, providing such a framework upon which to base subjective
judgements must create a greater hope for just and rational findings.
Since the H’Naghten rules were created they have found expression
i.n the American judicial system in numerous ways. Why English legal
decisions in 1843 should have determined American judicial decisions
on the issue today is explained solely by the fact that Anglo-American
courts traditionally have had difficulty with this topic, and most
states have followed British law rather than grapple with the problem
themselves. Once the H’Naghten rules were applied in America, judges
tended to view it as precedent and, as previously stated, extremely
difficult to change.
Though the H’Naghten rules were imported by the United States, they
were net always accepted in their totality. Two early cases (State v.
Spencer, 1846 and Geaz v. State, 1896) held that the only true test
for insanity is whether or not the defendant realized that he was
morally wrong at the time the act was committed. No other criteria
were allowed by these courts. In both Commonwealth v. Freth (1853)
and Commonwealth v. Heidler (1899), the juries were told that in order
to find the defendant not guilty due to insanity they must believe
that the offender, at the time of the act, was not capable
of dis~
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tinguishing between right and wrong. Additionally, if the defendant
was suffering from delusions, he would be excused if the mistaken
beliefs would have served as a defense if they had in fact been
correct. Bolling v. State 0-891), State v. English 0913), and Bell
v. State 0915) held that if, at the time of the act, the defendant
was suffering from a disease of the mind such that he did not know
the nature and quality of the act he was committing or did not know
he was doing wrong then he would be relieved of criminal responsibility.
Scate v. Dues trow, 0897) defined insanity as the inability to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong in reference to the act in question,
and, also, the inability to comprehend the character and nature of
the act. In People v. Schmidt 0915) the judge took great pains to
define the word "wrong.” Knowledge of law was not held to be a deciding
factor in criminal responsibility. To be relieved of responsibility,
the offender must lack moral knowledge. Simply having a moral view at
variance with those that find expression in the law is not enough;
rather, this variance must have originated from a disease of the mind.
When mentally retarded persons have been brought into court on
criminal charges, judges have defined insanity in similar fashions.
Courts have typically looked upon knowledge of right and wrong as the
deciding factor (see State v. Saxon, 1913 and Wartana v. State, 1885).
In an unusual case (State v . Richard, 1894), the judge, when instructing
the jury, stated that the evidence was sufficient to indicate that the
defendant had committed the act. The question was whether or not the
prisoner had the mental capacity for criminal intent. Realizing that
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knowledge of right and wrong and consequences and effects is a matter
of degree, the judge utilized a formula proposed by Lord Hale. He
instructed the jury to reach a verdict of not guilty due to insanity
if* in the jury's opinion, the defendant had a mental capacity less
than the average fourteen year old child. It is interesting to note
that evidence regarding IQ testing was frequently not admitted in
these early cases.
In concluding this section, it must be made clear that the M’Naghten
rules were designed to assist courts in making decisions regarding
criminal responsibility when confronted with mentally ill defendants
who were suffering from delusions. The M’Naghten court made no
attempt to distinguish between different types of mental conditions
which might affect criminal responsibility decisions. The retarded
person is placed in a particular disadvantageous position when the
M’Naghten rules are applied, for while he may recognize that a parti-
cular act is wrong, he may not be able to fully comprehend the serious-
ness or consequences of the act.
The idea behind M’Naghten, that a person cannot be guilty of a
crime without criminal intent Cor mens rea ) is basically sound. For
example, a man who suffers a stroke while driving a car and kills a
pedestrian is not guilty of a crime. However, if the driver inten-
tionally hits a person then a crime has been committed.
The implementation and results of M’Naghten, however, present a
number of problems. First, M’Naghten tends to confuse issues such as
ability to distinguish between right and wrong. It is doubtful that
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anyone can be totally unable to make that distinction, and yet this is
what M'Naghten apparently seeks. Second, while varying degrees Of
mental illness are recognized in contemporary thought, partial
insanity as conceptualized in this history is not accepted today as
a valid type of mental disorder. Third, although probably these
rules were never meant to apply to all types of defendants and sit-
uations, they have been applied as if they were. Fourth, there is
considerable difficulty in applying these rules through juries in
courts. Fifth, numerous critics believe that these rules do not
remove criminal responsibility from many persons who should be so
relieved. Sixth, these rules specify as a criterion lack of knowledge
concerning law. As is commonly known, ignorance of the law has
never been an accepted defense in Anglo-American courts and its in-
clusion in these rules has tended to be confusing. Seventh, the
judges generated considerable confusion by including knowledge of the
nature and quality of the act as one of the tests and at the same
tine failing to define nature and quality. Eighth, medical persons
were established as expert witnesses in these cases, but the sole use
of a physician in making a diagnosis in all cases creates a problem
in itself. In addition, courts have relied on physicians to answer
questions regarding these tests such as knowledge of right and wrong.
Certainly physicians are no more qualified to answer these questions
than other persons and, at times, may be less able to give an accurate
answer. And last, the judges formulated these rules in an attempt to
establish justice for insane offenders without reference to the post-
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acquittal issue. M’Naghten, in fact, spent the rest of his life in
confinement. This case provided a model for other courts, and up
until recently it has been common practice for individuals acquitted
for even minor charges to be kept in institutions for life.
The Irresistible - Impulse Test
The irresistible-impulse test is never the sole test of criminal
responsibility but in at least fifteen states it is used in conjunction
with, the M'Naghten right-and-wrong test (see Brakel & Rock, 1971,
p. 380).
It has long been a tradition in Anglo-American law that persons
who have no control over their behavior are not responsible for their
actions. For example, if a person, under threat of death, is coerced
into committing a robbery, he is not criminally liable. With the
irresistible-impulse test, however, it is not clear that the behavior
is irresistible since the elements which make the behavior irresistible
cannot be observed. The assumption in this test is that sanity is
associated with the ability to resist impulses while insanity is
associated with opposing conditions. The test is relevant in cases
where th.e offender knows the quality and nature of the act and can
also distinguish between right and wrong but is not able to resist
committing a criminal act because of an overpowering impulse originating
from mental disability. The test is believed to take into account tne
conative—emotional aspects of an individuals personality.
The test has received a considerable amount o£ criticism stating
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that the only proof of irresistible-impulse is the actual occurrence
of the act. The question is, whether or not it is possible to dis-
tinguish an unresisted impulse from an irresistible impulse associated
with insanity. Clearly juries are responsible for deciding whether
or not the offender's mental condition rendered him unable to resist
committing the criminal act. Additionally, they must decide whether
or not an inability to resist committing an act originated from mental
illness.
The irresistible-impulse test is American in origin and was first
expressed in Ohio in 1834 in State v. Thompson. The judge in that
trial instructed the jury to reach a verdict of not guilty if the
defendant was unable to either discriminate between right and wrong
or was unable to resist the act. In 1844 Chief Justice Shaw (Common-
wealth v. Rogers) instructed the jury to use the M'Naghten rules in
deciding criminal responsibility and additionally "...if the disease
existed to such a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the
reason, conscience, and judgement, and whether the prisoner, in
committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent,
but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind
directing it,"
In a frequently quoted case (Commonwealth v. Mosler, 186*4)
.
Chief Justice Gibson appeared to recognize the difficulties in using
this test and attempted to give the jury cautious and clearly defined
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instructions. The Chief Justice told the jury that the defendant
would be relieved of responsibility only when his perception of right
and wrong was totally absent. In further instructions the justice
defined "moral" or "homicidal insanity" as "...consisting of an
irresistible impulse to kill, or to commit some other particular
offence. There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind,
drawing it to consequences which, it sees, but cannot avoid, and
placing it under a coercion, which, while its results are clearly
perceived, is incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges
this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only
in the clearest cases. It ought to be shown to have been habitual,
or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instance. It
is seldom directed against a particular individual, but that it may
be is proved by the case of the young woman who was deluded by an
irresistible impulse to destroy her child, though aware of the heinous
nature of the act. The frequency of this constitutional malady is
fortunately small, and it is better to confine it within the strictest
limits. If juries were to allow it as a general motive, operating in
cases of this character, its recognition would destroy social order
as well as personal safety. To estahlish. it as a justification in
any particular case, it is, necessary either to show, by clear proofs,
its contemporaneous existence evinced by present circumstances, oc the
existence of an habitual tendency developed in previous cases, becoming
in itself a second nature."
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Numerous other states adopted irresistible-impulse as a defense
(see State, v. Felter, 1868; Blackburn v. State, 1872; Hays v. Common-
wealth, 1896; State v. Clancy, 1915; Clark v. State, 1843). All of
the courts permitting irresistible-impulse as a defense hold that the
impulse must be the product of mental disability. An irresistible
impulse cannot be the uncontrolled passion of a "sane” person.
There are a number of problems with this test. First, as with the
M’Naghten rules, it is primarily concerned with mental illness and
does not focus on the mentally retarded. Second, this test in action
has proven to be difficult for juries due to the fact that, as pre-
viously mentioned, this judgement cannot be made through observation.
Rather, juries must examine both the behavior of the defendant and
the testimony of psychiatrists in order to make the inferential leap
this test requires.
The Product Rule
In 1871 the New Hampshire Supreme Court discarded the M’Naghten
rules as inadequate and established what was later to be labeled the
product rule (State y Jones, 1871). The product rule, as stated in
this case, held that no man shall be criminally responsible for an
act which is the "offspring and product of mental diseases. In its
criticism of the M’Naghten rules the court stated that in most cases
where it is apparent that "disease has attacked the mind...
it has
not wholly obliterated the will, the conscience, and
mental power,
but has left its victim still in possession of some degree
of ability
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in some or all of these qualities." This decision actually came out
of a minority opinion voiced by Judge Doe in an earlier New Hampshire
case (State v. Pike, 1869).
New Hampshire was alone in using this rule until 1954 (Durham
V. U.S.) when it was adopted in its essence by the Federal Courts of
Washington D.C. In this case, if the defendant's act was the product
of a mental disease or defect he was not criminally liable. In
attempting to clarify this rule, "disease" was defined as a condition
'’which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating"
and "defect" was defined as a condition which would not either improve
or deteriorate and which could either be cogenital, the result of
injury, or the residual effect of mental or physical disease.
In Durham v. U.S., Judge Bazelon criticized M’Naghten as concerning
itself only with the cognitive aspect of man’s functioning. Bazelon
stated that the problem was not that the right and wrong test rests
upon an inadequate, invalid, or indeterminate sympton or manifestation
but rather, that it rests upon any particular symptom. This case
additionally held that all relevant professional disciplines could
testify in court.
The product rule was refined by two later cases in Washington, D.C.
First, McDonald v, U.S. (1962) further defined "disease" or delect"
as any abnormal condition of the mind substantially affecting mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairing behavior controls.
Second, Washington v, U.S. (1967) clarified the role of the psychiatrist
in court. Psychiatrists were prohibited from testifying as to whether
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or not the criminal act was the product of a mental disease or defect.
This question was to be answered only by the jury. Psychiatric wit-
nesses, however, could testify on how the disease or defect related
to the development, adaptation, and functioning of the defendant’s
behavioral processes. In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia rejected the product rule and adopted
the Model Penal Code rule (United States v. Brawner) . This change
occurred primarily from the unfounded belief that the Durham decision
would release a large number of potentially harmful individuals
(Gasch, 1959).
The Product Rule has not been widely accepted and, as a matter of
fact, only two other jurisdictions, Maine and the Virgin Islands,
have adopted it. Obviously, the Product Rule does not include the
concept of insanity. Whether or not the definitions of mental
disease and defect are an improvement is debatable. As with other
tests, the jury has two tasks. It must first decide whether or not
the defendant has a relevant mental condition. Second, if the accused
does have a relevant mental condition, the jury must determine
whether or not the act was a product of that condition. Apparently
there was an attempt to include mental retardation as a relevant
condition under the label of defect. But this definition leaves so
much to be desired that its use will probably do very little to assist
juries in making these decisions.
A second criticism involves the concept of product. The product
rule calls for juries to make a causal connection, and making this
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connection is a formidable task. Critics arguing the above two
points assert that M’Naghten was superior since it defined criminal
responsibility in more definite terms (see Sobeloff, 1958 and Gutt-
macher, 1968, p, 34). The New Hampshire and District of Columbia
decisions deliberately built in ambiguity, since these courts felt
that replacing one set of theories with another would lead to problems,
the generation of new knowledge possibly making any well-defined rule
outdated. Though this may indeed occur the wisdom of refusing to
use all available current knowledge is dubious. The issue seems to
revolve around the need to recognize when current conceptions are
clearly outdated and to take appropriate corrective action.
A third criticism is that the ambiguities involved in the product
rule enable many persons who ought to be punished to escape justice
and thereby allow these individuals to continue to present a threat
to society. Whether or not this criticism is borne out by fact is
still unclear, since relevant research has yet to be conducted. It
is clear, however, that society reacts with fear to persons who have
committed offenses and suffer from mental disabilities. The District
of Columbia, soon after the Durham decision, enacted legislation
which mandated institutionalization for individuals found not guilty
by reason of mental disability in their courts. The implications of
this type of action are very negative and will be explored in more
detail in a later chapter.
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The Model Penal Code Standard and Vermont Rule
The Vermont legislature, in 1959, (Vermont Statutes Annotated,
4801) enacted a law which essentially rejected the M T Naghten Rules
and instituted instead a rule almost identical to that proposed in
the Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 1962, p. 66). The
Vermont law states "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law. 1 ' In
attempting to clarify "disease” and "defect” the law further states
that these terms do not include any abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or antisocial conduct but that they do include
congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease.
The Model Penal Code differs from the Vermont law only in two
respects. First, it substitutes the word "substantial" for "adequate."
Whether or not this difference has any impact on jury behavior is
unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that it does not. Second, the
code includes "(wrongfulness)” after the word criminality and thus
clearly indicates that appreciation of morality is important.
This formulation has been adopted by at least ten states and at
least eight of the eleven federal circuits (see U.S. v. Shapiro, 1967;
U.S, v. Freeman, 1966; and Wion v. U.S., 1963).
This test for criminal responsibility is nothing more than a
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broadening of the M’ Naghten and irresistible-impulse rules. The
broadening is accomplished by requiring only a substantial impairment
of capacity rather than total impairment. Since one of the criticisms
of M Naghten is its all or none quality, this represents an improvement.
A number of criticisms have been leveled at this formulation (see
Brakel & Rock, 1971, p. 385; Hall, 1957 and Roche, 1958, p. 180).
First, the phrase "result of" creates the same problems associated with
causality in the product rule. Second, the Vermont wording can be
interpreted to exclude moral knowledge and to require only that the
defendant have legal knowledge. As mentioned in relation to M'Naghten,
the requirement of legal knowledge is problematic. Third, there
appears to be too much reliance upon cognition. Fourth, while it
appears that Vermont includes the mentally retarded in their test,
it is not clear that the American Law Institute does likewise. Fifth,
the definitions of disease and defect are ambiguous. In general,
many of the same criticisms levelled at M T Naghten can be brought to
bear against the Vermont or Model Penal Code tests.
Abolition of the Insanity Defense
A number of authors have suggested that the insanity defense should
be abolished. These writers can be divided into two camps. The first
group (e.g. Menninger, 1968; Wooton, 1963; and Alexander & Staub, 1927)
maintains that psychiatry is an important element in all criminal
proceedings. When a defendant is before the court, the issue is never
whether or not the accused is insane. Rather, if the defendant
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committed the act in question, the question is what type(s) of treat-
ment can be offered to ensure the rehabilitation of the offender.
According to this theory, the psychiatrist plays a dominant role in
diagnosis and the prescription of treatment.
This philosophy views criminal behavior as indicative of an
illness (Menninger, p. 254, Wooton, p. 76), and maintains that when
an illness has been identified, treatment should be applied. The
object of treatment is to protect the community from a repetition of
the offense in the most economical method possible. Menninger (p. 263)
states that, at least for the present, this treatment must occur within
prisons, since mental hospitals cannot provide the security which
most of these people require. However, he expects that if his plan
is implemented, mental hospitals would soon provide the bulk of these
services.
A major problem with this formulation is the belief that psychiatry
can effectively change criminal behavior and that mental hospitals
represent treatment (a full discussion of this issue will be contained
in a later chapter). In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that
psychiatric techniques can effect these changes and further, it is
common knowledge that mental hospitals are frequently little more
than prisons themselves, Menninger ’s expressed faith (p. 263) in the
treatment value of mental hospitals is difficult to understand.
This philosophy advocates that psychiatrists not only determine
when it is safe to release a convicted person, but also, that they
should determine when treatment is impossible and detain those, offenders
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indefinitely. Giving psychiatrists this extremely broad authority
would likely threaten the security and freedom of all people in our
society. Even if society were willing to trust psychiatrists with
its freedom, the differences which exist between these professionals
as evidenced by the battle of the experts phenomenon in courts makes
this recommendation utterly unworkable.
The second group of writers (e.g. Szasz, 1963 and Morris, 1976)
suggest that psychiatrists should be kept completely out of the
criminal justice system. These authors feel that the intrusion of
psychiatry has led to the neglect of the civil liberties of offenders
(Szasz, p. 103), Violations of civil liberties have indeed occurred
when persons relieved of criminal responsibility have been placed
in mental hospitals. Psychiatric involvement is seen as an in-
appropriate intrusion into a criminal justice system which should
aim at identifying and penalizing offenders. According to Morris,
the mentally disabled defendant should be granted the same rights
as are guaranteed to all offenders under the constitution.
The basic questions asked by this philosophy are as follows (Brakel
6 Rock, 1971, p. 378);
1. Should the criminal justice system make a distinction between
offenders who should be treated and those who should be punished?
2. Do penal and mental health institutions bear any resemblance
to punishment and treatment, respectively?
3. Is the defense of insanity in any formulation workable?
4. What is the value of psychiatric testimony in criminal
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proceedings?
The elimination of the insanity defense appears to be uncon-
stitutional. The attempts of Washington, Mississippi, and Louisiana
to abolish this defense all were found to be unconstitutional in
three separate cases (State v. Strasberg, 1910; Sinclair v. State,
1931; and State v. Lange, 1929).
It appears that insanity will continue to be a valid defense
since its elimination has received no support within our judicial
system. The questions, however, which are raised by this viewpoint
are important and should be addressed. The first question asks
whether or not courts should identify some offenders as being not
responsible for their behavior and thus, recommend treatment rather
than punishment. Certainly, in our society there are persons with
such severe mental deficits (e.g. a profoundly retarded person)
that they are denied many of their civil rights. Since society believes
that these persons are incapable of caring for themselves and making
informed decisions, it is a travesty of justice to hold them responsible
for any behavior classified as criminal. The punishment versus
treatment issue is complex, and will, therefore, be explored in
depth in a later chapter.
The second question posed is whether or not mental hospitals and
prisons represent treatment and punishment respectively. As mentioned
previously, mental hospitals are all too often little better than jails
and any resemblance to a treatment facility frequently is
accidental.
The third question asks whether or not any formulation oC the
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insanity defense is workable. Such a question ignores the fact that
any process designed to identify those guilty of offenses is faulty.
That is, with all the safeguards built into the American system, it
is not unusual for persons to be wrongly convicted. What is at issue
is not to find a perfect way of distinguishing between responsible
and irresponsible defendants but, rather, to discover how to best
use current knowledge to accurately identify these persons and, at
the same time, to preserve societal interests.
In the last question, the value of psychiatric testimony is
questioned. Indeed, this author believes that the value of psychiatric
testimony as it has been used in the past is indeed dubious. The
exclusivity of psychiatric testimony when gathering evidence on
criminal responsibility has certainly presented a problem. Since
insanity is a legal rather than a medical term, it is difficult to
see why others would not testify. Psychiatrists are not trained to
answer questions related to a person’s capability for moral knowledge.
Certainly psychiatrists are no more qualified than anyone else to
answer these types of questions.
Summary and Conclusions
Insanity as a defense was first recognized in English courts during
the reign of Edward II (1307-1321) and became entrenched in law under
the sovereignty of Edward III (1326-1377). The test used to determine
criminal irresponsibility in most cases has been whether or not the
defendant had knowledge that the alleged act was wrong when it was
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committed. We haye seen that this knowledge test originated in the
writings of Bracton during the thirteenth century. The K’Naghten case
of 1843 firmly established the test in both the English and American
judicial systems.
The M r Naghten rules have been criticized almost from the time of
conception and therefore, alternative rules have been established
in the United States. The irresistible-impulse test, first formulated
in the United States and often used in conjunction with the knowledge
test, excuses persons from criminal responsibility when they are
unable to control their behavior because of mental illness. Another
test established in the United States is the product rule, which
declares that if the criminal act is a product of mental disease then
the defendant is not criminally responsible. The Model Penal Code
standards and Vermont rule were also formulated in the United States
and are little more than a restatement of the knowledge and irresistible-
impulse tests.
Attacks on and criticisms of these tests continue today. It is
easy to conclude that our difficulties with criminal responsibility
are rooted in the past. Many of the ideas generated in the past and
used at later dates were results of the arbitrary circumstances of who
happened to be writing about legal insanity rather than of a clear
analysis of contemporary knowledge concerning relevant mental conditions,
societal outcomes desired, and mens rea. It is likely that a
number
of factors have contributed to this situation. First, judges ar^.
expected to rely on precedent, once a precedent exists, there
is a
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tendency to follow rather than change it. Second, when ideas regarding
criminal responsibility were first being formulated, knowledge
regarding relevant mental conditions was considerably less than it
is now. Even today our understanding of these conditions is limited.
In the past, judges apparently felt compelled to follow the advice
of almost anyone who claimed to be an authority. And again, once
precedent is set, judges tend to use it as the rationale behind later
decisions. Third, persons who can successfully be defended on the
grounds of insanity are characterized by many as socially deviant.
Most persons react towards these deviant individuals with fear. Any
judge or legislature attempting to liberalize criminal responsibility
tests is bound to incur the wrath of the public, as evidenced by public
reaction following the M’Naghten case. Even when the Durham decision
was reached, a considerable amount of criticism came from the press,
and soon after, the legislature passed a law mandating institution-
alization of persons in Washington D.C. found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
If one examines the arguments contained in this literature, it
appears that the major question is where society is to draw the
line between those who are to be held responsible for criminal acts
and those who are not. The author included Figure 1 as a useful tool
in this analysis.
Within Figure 1, mental condition represents an abstract variable
which in one of its extremes can relieve a defendant of
responsibility.
For example, it can represent intelligence or mental health
such that
9 '(
Fig.
1.
Thaoretical
curve
illustrating
the
incidence
of
insanity
within
society
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bhe right side of the distribution, is the more healthy or intelligent
portion of the population. Point A represents that point along the
continuum where we separate those individuals who are responsible
for their actions from those who are not. Since persons who are not
responsible are located to the left of A, the ability of persons
relieved of responsibility increases and the number of persons so
relieved increases as A moves to the right. Since there is no
absolute way to determine where point A is placed, its location is
dependent upon each person r s ideas concerning how justice would bast
be served. This, of course, involves subjective judgement.
Figure 2 is included to further illustrate this point. The
quadrants ca,n be conceptualized as containing frequency counts. This
figure shows how individuals perceive cases where insanity is used as
a defense. When justice is served, an entry is made in the upper left
quadrant (x ) or lower right quadrant (x) . Such entries indicate
that the court and the perceiver place point A in Fig. 1 at the same
place. In such cases, critics do not appear. However, when entries
are made in other quadrants, criticism arises. In the upper right
quadrant (y) the perceiver believes the accused to be insane but the
court finds him to be sane. In this case the perceiver would criticize
the test used by the court as too restrictive. Only when the court
moved point A in Fig. 1 further to the right would this critic be
satisfied. In the lower left quadrant (z)
,
the perceiver believes
the defendant is sane and the court finds him to be insane. Here
the perceiver sees the court as too lenient, and again, cri-Licisn
Court finding
of insanity
Court finding
of sanity
Defendant
perceived by
outsider as
insane
Defendant
perceived by
outsider as
sane
X y
z
Fig. 2, Individual perceptions of justice in cases where the
defense is insanity.
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would occur. In this case however, there is not a concern for the
well-being of the defendant. Instead, fear probably occurs with the
belief that deviant persons who represent a threat to society are
being placed back on the streets. Only when the court’s test moved
point A in Fig, 1 to the left would this critic be satisfied.
Of course, these examples are extremely simplified but they do
serve a purpose. The figures demonstrate that two distinct subjective
judgements frequently are made by critics. First, where to place point
A in Fig, 1 is a subjective judgement. Second, whether or not a
given defendant is significantly affected by a relevant mental condition
is a subjective judgement. This author believes that decision rules
which more clearly show where the courts consider point A to be and
more clearly indicate when incapacitating mental conditions exist
would help to decrease the variability among the judgements made by
various jurors. Interestingly, courts have refused to use current
knowledge in framing these decision rules and even today there tends
to be confusion among the various mental conditions which can lead
to relief of responsibility.
The public’s fear regarding the insanity defense is quite reasonable
given that our learned courts display extreme confusion in so many cases
The author has personally witnessed, on a number of occasions, our
criminal justice system refuse to try persons who have engaged in
criminal activity but do not have any mental conditions which would
legally relieve them of responsibility. These cases have involved
persons living in institutions for the retarded, and thus, the court
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has attached the label of retardation to them without examining data
regarding diagnosis. However, if these persons had committed serious
crimes (e.g. murder) they would very likely have been tried.
The public’s faith in our criminal justice system’s dealings with
insanity is further undermined by the "battle of the experts"
spectacle* Where there are cases in which the defendant is supposedly
suffering from a mental disability, opposing psychiatrists frequently
S—ve contradicting testimony. The public cannot help but conclude
that if we cannot even accurately identify persons who are mentally
disabled, then justice cannot be served in these proceedings. The
outcome in these cases is, therefore, seen as threatening to society.
Not only does there exist a neglect of current knowledge, but
little research in this area has been conducted, and that which has
been done has not led to solid conclusions. For example, the Predident's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia Q-966) found that since
1962, under the Durham rule, "insanity acquittals have stabilized at
two or three percent of all defendants." Another study has found
that insanity acquittals in the District of Columbia before Durham
were between 0.2 percent and 0.6 percent of all defendants, and
following Durham these acquittals rose to six percent (Simon, 1967).
Why such variability among research results should exist is not clear.
It is evident, however, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
draw conclusions from these data.
Although works such as the present one can point in new directions,
firm conclusions regarding criminal responsibility cannot be reached
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until considerable research has been conducted. To increase the
utility of this type of research, the legal profession must establish
standards, methods, and procedures which will allow comparisons
across projects. Only when such comparisons occur can sense be made
of the literature in this area.
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CHAPTER V
PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT
Most literature regarding criminal responsibility is concerned
with punishment and treatment, asserting that those who are not held
criminally responsible should receive treatment for any illegal
actions. Treatment, if successful, assists the individual in staying
within legal boundaries. On the other hand, persons who are convicted
of criminal offenses are candidates for punishment, a method intended
to discourage the offender from committing such criminal acts in
the future. According to this line of reasoning, prisons are primary
agents for delivering punishment to offenders, and mental retardation
institutions or mental health institutions deliver treatment to those
relieved of criminal responsibility.
This chapter will examine the merits and validity of the punish-
ment and treatment differentiation as used by the criminal justice
system. The concepts themselves will first be explored to distinguish
the theoretical differences between them. Next, the actual performance
of prisons, and mental health and mental retardation institutions
will be presented together with a discussion of the development and
history of these facilities.
Punishment and Treatment as Concepts
Punishment, as utilized by the criminal justice system, is intended
as more than merely a noxious or painful experience.
Equally important
of authority and morals (Fitzgerald, 1962, p. 199
and
are the notions
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Hall, 1960, p. 309). Punishment can be defined as a coerced privation
that is inflicted by the state Can authority figure) upon persons who
have violated a set of rules established by society. The extent of
punishment is, at least theoretically, somehow equivalent to the extent
of the harm created by the violation.
The infliction of punishment upon those who have violated societal
laws has a long history CBarnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 391), beginning in
primitive societies where it was used partially to protect the community
from further violations but for the primary purpose of placating the
gods by whom the wrong-does was believed to be "possessed."
In modern society, punishment is said to have four major objectives.
These objectives are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
individual intimidation CTappan, 1960, p. 241).
Retribution satisfies society’s desire for revenge against the
offender CClyne, 1973, p. 86). This retaliation is based on the
belief that man has free will and is responsible for his acts, and that,
therefore, society has the right to "balance the accounts." Obviously,
the major thrust for retribution is moral. Throughout history,
retribution has been the single largest component of punishment
CLeinwand, 1972, p. 22). While retribution still is a significant
force in our criminal justice system and is evidenced by statements
such as "making the punishment fit the crime," the morality
of this
motivation and the wisdom of pursuing this objective is highly
questionable. It is likely that it is impossible to
eradicate the
moral outrage felt by society when serious crimes
are committed, but
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the criminal justice system can and should he above such emotional
reactions. Retribution does not assist in achieving the stated aim
of the criminal law to protect society and, in fact, may be counter-
productive. A response which is oriented toward preventing future
offenses and thus protecting society would be more sound.
Deterrence as justification for punishment was first adopted in
the eighteenth century (Leopold, 1970). This justification is believed
to prevent potential offenders from committing criminal acts by the
threat of punishment. A potential offender, realizing that criminal
activity may lead to punishment ,may be motivated to avoid engaging in
those activities. The effectiveness of deterrence has been questioned
by numerous authorities, many of whom have cited the example provided
by English justice 150 years ago (Leopold, 1970). At that time,
criminal punishment was harsh.' and public. Ricking pockets, for
example, was a crime which was punishable by death, and yet when
public hangings were being observed by enormous crowds, the occurrence
of pocket picking was extremely high. Though this example does damage
to the deterrence theory, it does not wholly disprove it, and it is
still likely that deterrence has some impact on at least some
individuals. Another variable which weakens the impact of the deterrence
theory is that the likehood of being caught and convicted is known to
be very low. Host crimes are never reported to the police,
those which
are reported are usually not solved, and most persons
arrested cannot
be convicted of the crime (American Friends Service
Committee, 1971,
j
p. 52). The thought of potential punishment
as a deterrant is therefore
I
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surely decreased. as the probability of being caught and convicted
decreases.
Incapacitation as an objective of punishment seeks to remove
the offender from society and thereby render him unable to commit
additional offenses while incarcerated. The imprisonment of criminals
does indeed place severe limits on the opportunities to engage in
criminal activities within the context of the society outside of
prison. Incapacitation, therefore, is effective for the larger
society, if only temporarily. However, incapacitation appears to have
much less impact on criminal activity in general since crime inside
prisons predominates (Leopold, 1970). In order to weigh the overall
value of incapacitation, the probability of further criminal activity
must be assessed. Whenever an individual is convicted and sentenced,
the length of the sentence should be directly related to the pro-
bability of committing future offenses. There are data to indicate
that frequently murderers do not commit additional crimes whereas
with minor offenses such as prostitution, shoplifting, etc., there is
a high probability of repetition (Tappan, 1960, p. 256). Obviously,
murderers receive much longer jail sentences than persons who commit
minor offenses j and therefor® the function of incapacitation
is
frequently weakened by matching the extent of punishment with the
seriousness of the offense.
Individual intimidation is directly related to recidivism in
that an offender who has been punished for a criminal
offense should
be discouraged from repetition by this experience.
Since the recidivism
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rate in the United States can reach as high as sixty percent, the
utility of this function is severely limited. Additionally, many
persons believe that imprisonment may in fact be counter-productive
in that it embitters incarcerated individuals and thus leads them to
commit further crimes upon release. Much has also been written to
indicate that prisoners, through their association with one another,
obtain additional ideas and skills to enable them to avoid capture when
committing future criminal acts.
Interestingly, treatment at times overlaps punishment. Although
punishments dominant characteristic is frequently conceived as being
either painful or noxious, treatment, at times, may also involve pain,
often, in fact, a considerable amount. For example, one can find
instances in psychology literature of the use of painful stimuli to
change a person 1 s behavior. Also, the treatment ideal states that
human behavior has antecedent causes and that behavioral scientists
can identify and specify these causes. The ability to specify these
causes enables the scientist to change and control human behavior.
This identification of causes then leads to the design and implementation
of measures intended to effect behavioral changes in the interests of
the individual *s happiness, health, and satisfactions and also, in the
interest of society (Allen, 1973, p. 193 and Rubin, Weihofen, Edwards,
Rosenzweig, 1963, p. 665). Treatment then is not only concerned with
the security of society but also with humanitarianism, a belief
in
the worth and dignity of every human being. Punishment
and treatment
are, therefore, both interested in protecting society
and preventing
105
future criminal acts.
The treatment model makes a number of assumptions. First, when-
ever a person engages in illegal activity it is a problem of individual
pathology, and the frequency of this activity can be reduced by
treatment and the resultant cure (American Friends Service Committee,
1971, p. 40), The causal factors behind crime probably go beyond the
individual and undoubtedly have some relationship to social variables
such as poverty, parental guidance, sub-culture influence, etc.
To the extent that these social variables influence the occurrence of
criminal activity, the assumption of individual pathology is undermined.
Second, the treatment model assumes that we know the individual
causes of crime or behavior (American Friends Service Committee, 1971,
p. 41). Though society has and is generating scientific data which
enables it to understand behavior better than it has in the past, our
knowledge of the causal factors behind behavior remains quite limited.
Outside of the laboratory, our ability to either predict or understand
the causes of behavior remains very limited.
Third, the identification of causes leads to the specification
of treatment interventions. Since the causes are poorly understood
the types of treatment interventions which are implemented must also
be lacking.
Upon examining the concepts of punishment and treatment
together
the differences between them on a theoretical level become
clear.
Punishment involves a noxious experience brought to bear on
an
individual who has violated societal rules. The extent
of punishment
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is somehow related to the degree of harm created by the individual.
Treatment, while it may use noxious experiences, also uses many other
approaches. The approach used is not determined by the criminal act
but, rather, by the causes behind the act and inevitably by what can
change the person’s behavior. The treatment model therefore calls
for an individualized approach. Treatment also demands the use of
knowledge obtained from the behavioral sciences in designing inter-
ventions. Both punishment and treatment are aimed toward changing
the behavior of the offender, but the punishment model does so
exclusively for the benefit of society while the treatment model
focuses on both society and the individual offender.
Prisons
Prisons, as we know them today, were first established less than
two hundred years ago. Prior to that, persons were held in prisons
while they waited either for trial or punishment. Punishment, at
that time, consisted of torture, death, or mutilation (Leinwand, 1972,
p. 24). Imprisonment was eventually eagerly substituted for this
brutality.
After America gained her independence and the nation was established,
Americans believed that they had uncovered the cause of criminality.
With patriotic fervor and humanitarian values they believed
that
criminal behavior was perpetuated by the colonial criminal
codes
(Rothman, 1971, p. 59) which called for the application
of cruel and
107
severe punishments. The problem with these codes was twofold. First,
the severity of the punishments drove people to commit further crimes
to avoid capture for the first one. Second, punishment, to be
effective, had to be definite and consistant, and Americans, while
under British rule, had frequently seen juries turn guilty persons
free rather than sentence them to severe punishments for minor
infractions.
With missionary zeal Americans expected that punishment which was
certain and humane would eliminate or curtail criminal behavior, and
in the 1790’s a number of prisons were built as substitutes for
severe punishments. This development of prisons as punishing devices
was a reflection of what was happening in much of Europe (Rothman,
1971, p. 61) and was an outgrowth of the development of humanitarian
ideals. Since these early Americans identified the problem of criminal
behavior with the criminal code, prisons themselves were never
examined. No one believed that prisons would rehabilitate offenders.
Instead it was felt that the loss of freedom, in and of itself, would
suffice to change the offenders’ behavior. In these early prisons
the sentence length was directly related to the seriousness of the crime.
By the 182Q’ s Americans had lost faith in this early ideal, due
to the failure of the system to reduce criminal behavior (Rothman,
1971, p. 62) and the popularity of writings by prison critics and
reformers such as John Howard (Bernes & Teeters, 1950, p. 480).
Americans, having lost their belief that the colonial criminal codes
led to criminal behavior, turned to the individual offender s
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for explanations. Many biographical sketches were made
of offenders, and it seemed that all criminal behavior could be
traced to a childhood which lacked appropriate education and discipline
(Rothman, 1971, p. 68). If one believed that a faulty environment
created criminal behavior, then all that need be done was to alter
the environment in which the offender lived. Offenders could be
removed to a special environment which taught discipline and was
corruption-free.
John Howard, the greatest prison reformer of the time, first
pointed the way for the penitentiary system by examining conditions
in existing prisons and specifying the types of prisons which would
lead to the rehabilitation of offenders. He made the reformation of
prisons his life's work after having been captured by a French
privateer and incarcerated in a number of French prisons (Barnes &
Teeters, 1950, p. 480). After this ordeal ended he spent a number
of years visting prisons throughout Europe, his writings not only
exposing the deplorable conditions he observed but making recommend-
ations regarding humane treatment, sanitary conditions, etc. He is
also credited with first recommending that prisoners be kept isolated
so that they could reflect upon their transgressions, an idea which
was to lead to the development of the penitentiary (Leinwand, 1972,
p. 24). The word "penitentiary" comes from Latin and suggests
a
place to do penance for sins, and the idea postulated by Howard was
that if an offender was forced to think about his behavior,
he would
see the error of his ways.
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The penitentiaries which were finally developed were perceived
as providing a solution to a rising crime problem. More than that,
however, these institutions were supposed to have dramatic impact
on society as a whole by demonstrating proper socialization. When
me community observed the success that these institutions had,
society would adopt the practices used by the penitentiary. Given
this belief, the early penitentiaries received considerable publicity
md were the pride of the nation. Since penitentiaries primarily
called for isolation of prisoners, architecture absorbed these early
reformers. Considerable effort was put into designing a facility that
made it impossible for prisoners to communicate with each other without
official sanction,
Pennsylvania was the first state to establish this new type of
correctional facility when, in 1829, the Eastern Penitentiary was
cuilt: in Philadelphia, This institution epitomized the most influential
penal philosophy ever conceived by man (Barnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 507).
The dominant principle at the Eastern Penitentiary was solitude or
separate confinement, a separation complete except for rare visits
from ''moral instructors". The facility contained "four hundred large
solitary cells in seven cell blocks emanating from a central rotunda,
each cell having a small individual exercise yard. Massive walls
surrounded the institution and divided its parts so as to eliminate all
contact and to make escape impossible" (Tappan, 1960, p. 607).
Margaret Wilson (1931, pp. 219-220) has provided some insight
regarding what it was like living in the Eastern Penitentiary. When
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an offender arrived he was given a hot bath and a uniform. He was then
led blindfolded to the rotunda where, still blindfolded, he "met' 1 the
warden and the rules of the facility were described. Still blindfolded
he was led to his cell where finally the bandage was removed from his
eyes. The cell he lived in was less than twelve feet long and eight
feet wide. If the cell was on the ground floor he could see a small
courtyard, the same size as the cell, highly walled, within which he
could sometimes exercise. The prisoner stayed in that cell and
courtyard without any change for his entire sentence. He was completely
cut off from the world and was not allowed visitors or mail. The guard
who brought meals was the primary person who had contact with the pri-
soner but the guard was not allowed to speak when delivering this
food. After three days in the cell the prisoner was allowed to work
if he requested it. Nearly all prisoners made this request and prison
reformers pointed to this as indicating that their scheme was working.
However, just as eating and sleeping occurred in solitude, work assign-
ments were carried out in the individual prisoner’s cell. Prisoners
were to leave the facility without knowing who else was incarcerated
there. Pennsylvania quickly established a second institution, the
Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh. This facility operated on the
same principles as the Eastern Penitentiary.
A second state attempting to reform its penal system was
New York,
erecting a penitentiary at Auburn in 1821, This facility had
smaller
cells than the Eastern Penitentiary: seven by three and
one half
feet, and no exercise yard was included. Additionally,
work was not
Ill
provided. This extreme idleness and separation quickly produced a
marked prevalence of physical illness and mental disturbance (Barnes
& Teeters, 1950, p. 520), and in 1924 a compromise which became
known as the Auburn "silent” system was adopted. The Auburn system
called for solitary confinement only at night. Work activities
occurred in congregate areas under a strict rule of silence. Manufact-
urers soon secured contracts to operate factories at Auburn which
employed prisoners at low wages (Tappan, 1960, p. 609). Manufacturing
enterprises within Auburn soon proved to be profitable. Auburn, in
an effort to control and eliminate communication among inmates,
instituted rules calling for marching in military lock step fashion
when going to and from activities. Prisoners were to keep their eyes
only upon their work in the workshop and on the guard when marching
and silence was to be observed at all times. Violations of these
rules were severely punished. The Auburn system led to greater pro-
duction output than the Pennsylvania system, (Tappan, 1960, p. 609)
and this, probably more than any other reason, explains the popularity
of the Auburn system. The productivity of the prisoners generated
revenue for the state and thereby made it less expensive to run the
facility. In 1925 New York started a second penitentiary which later
became known as Sing Sing, and soon most other states had followed
the example of New York, opening Auburn-system penitentiaries.
Considerable controversy was generated by the differences
between
the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems. The debate regarding
these
differences was intense and was carried on until
approximately 18/0
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(Barnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 533), Since both models called for pre-
venting prisoners from communicating with one another, the disagreement
centered around whether or not prisoners should work silently in
large groups or in solitary cells. The Pennsylvania system insisted
that their model carried the doctrine of isolation and reflection
to its logical conclusion. This arrangement prevented prisoners
from contaminating one another. One result of allowing prisoners
to gather in large groups was they would recognize one another and
thus increase the probability of their getting together for criminal
activities once released (Rothman, 1971, p. 87). The Auburn system
was seen as encouraging cruelty since the rules in that system were
frequently broken. Advocates of the Auburn system insisted that their
model led to the reformation of the prisoner while at the same, time
being economically expedient. The controversy between these systems
died out around 1879 when the inadequacy of each as a means for
reforming offenders was recognized and strict rules regarding silence
and solitude were gradually changed.
Not only did these penitentiaries fail at carrying out their
mission of reforming prisoners but they also failed at carrying cut
the dictates of their models. Pennsylvania, for example, found it
impossible to completely separate prisoners. Soon after the Eastern
Penitentiary was in operation it became necessary to place two prisoners
in one cell at selected times so that training in
performing work
functions could be carried on (Barnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 516).
Wanes
3.13
(1923, pp. 157-159) has identified the inventive techniques used by
prisoners to communicate with one another. For example, prisoners
established codes to tap out messages on water pipes. Soon doubling
up of prisoners became necessary since state capital appropriations
did not keep up with the growing population.
Since discipline was an important component in these penitentiaries
and the rules established by them were commonly broken, harsh punish-
ments became common, frequently being sadistic in nature (Rothman,
1971, p. 102) . This reliance on harsh treatment was exemplified most
clearly by Elam Lynds, the principal keeper directly under the warden
at the Auburn prison at its inception. Lynds was a firm believer in
flogging and used it to enforce the rules. When Sing Sing opened,
Lynds became warden there. He believed (Wines, 1895, p. 149) that pri-
soners could not be changed unless their spirits were broken and that
the purpose of penal discipline was to accomplish this so that
offenders wonld develop good work habits and religious attitudes.
Lynds encouraged his officers to treat prisoners with contempt and to
inflict cruel punishments.
The combination of the failure of penitentiaries and the rise of
social Darwinism in American thought paved the way for the current
state of penal institutions. Darwin published The Origin of
the Species
in 1859, and during tha last three decades of the
nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth century Darwin's
work dominated
social thought in the United States (Hofstadter, 1967, p.
4). At that
time a considerable amount of literature was generated
which attempted
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to apply Darwinian thought to social disciplines, spawning the resultant
social darwinism. Phrases such as "struggle for survival" and "survival
of the fittest" led to the conclusion that the best competitors in a
society would dominate and that this process would lead to continual
improvement. The development and improvement of society must occur
at a very slow pace and natural selection would be the primary process
in accomplishing this. Any attempts to tamper with this natural pro-
cess through social reform efforts would lead only to degeneration.
Herbert Spencer, an English writer, spent considerable time
applying Darwin* s theory to social issues and had considerable impact
on American thought. According to Spencer, sociology had the task of
identifying the normal course of social evolution and condemning all
types of behavior that interfer with it (Spencer, 1874, pp. 70-71).
Social science should demonstrate that social control was impossible
and man should readily submit to natural forces. Spencer (1864, pp.
79-80) opposed such things as banking and postal systems, poor laws,
state-supported education, and regulation of housing conditions.
William Graham Summer of Yale University was the most influential
social Darwinist in America and effectively spread his philosophy
through widely read hooka and magazines (Hofstadter, 1967, p. 51).
Summer, as Spencer, effectively used social determinism in his fight
against social reformers. Society was the product of centuries of
evolution and should not be. tampered with. Attempts uO refashion
society could only lead to disaster (Summer, 193*4, Vol. I, p« 105).
To Summer, society was an organism that changed only at a very
slow
rate. He viewed reformers as meddlers who believed that there were
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no natural laws governing the social order and that they could make
the world over with artificial ones (Summer, 1934, Vol. I, p. 215).
He expected social Darwinism to negate this erroneous belief.
The emergence of social Darwinism appeared to explain the failure
of previous efforts to reform the penal system. Additionally, it
indicated that further reform efforts were not only doomed to failure
Hut would cause additional harm. Offenders, under the doctrine of
survival of the fittest, were certainly not viewed as having desirable
characteristics which society wanted to nurture. Rather, social Darwin-
ism devalued such offenders as human beings. The American Breeder’s
Association, whose membership included persons such as Alexander
Graham Bell, became concerned with heredity in the human race. In
1910 the association had committees on mental retardation, mental
illness, criminality, deaf-mutism, mental traits, epilepsy, and
immigration (Blanton, 1975, p. 177). With this type of thinking
dominant, any discussion of improving conditions in prison was unlikely.
The problems that plagued prisons before Darwinian thought went unre-
solved, and since society turned its back on prisons, conditions
deteriorated.
Although social Darwinism is not today a major force in American
thought, the impact this philosophy had upon the American penal system
is still all too readily apparent. While there has been recent concern
over prison conditions and even renewed efforts to rehabilitate
offenders, these efforts have proved to be inadequate. They frequently
take the form of tinkering with existing reality rather than with
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enacting a total system change (Tappan, 1960, p. 237). While lip
service is frequently given rehabilitating offenders, it is usually
difficult to find anything in our prisons which appears to be
designed to reform prisoners (Brelje, 1976). Numerous authors have
supplied testimony regarding the degrading conditions of prison life
(Harris, 1967; Clemmer, 194Q; Lindner, 1946; Gaddis, 1955; Griswold,
Misenheimer, Powers, and Tromanhauser
,
1970; Cressey, 1958; and
Sykes, 1958) , While a loss of personal freedom is a punishing ex-
perience, the conditions within prison typically add additional punish-
ment onto the loss of freedom.
The director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
has stated that the term that best describes prisons is "evil" (Satten,
1963). Indeed, when individuals are placed in a desperate situation
and experience a total loss of rights, serious problems are bound to
occur. As late as 1967 incidents of torture, beatings, rape, murder,
and medical malpractice were reported by the press to be occurring in
the Tucker Prison Farm in Arkansas. Cells which were originally
constructed to provide solitude for one man are frequently still in
use except that now, two, three, or four man are frequently found
within them and solitary confinement for long periods of time is still
in use (McGraw & McGraw, 1954, p. 5). The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) described life
in, prison as barren and futile at best and unspeakably brutal and
degrading at worst. The Commission also cited drastic shortages of
resources including personnel and facilities, poorly trained and
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underpaid staff, unnecessary restrictions on inmate communication, the
marching of prisoners from one activity to another, overcrowding,
domination of prisoners by the most aggressive inmate, staff sanction-
ing of rackets, violence, corruption and coerced homosexuality, and
the existence of numerous prisons that are over one hundred years old
as common in our corrections systems.
Beside the application of punishment for the infraction of rules
which seem meaningless, Leinwand (1972, p. 58) cites the following as
representative of the ills plaguing American prisons: inadequate
funding, overcrowding, poorly trained and paid personnel, inadequate
professional personnel, inadequate and poor food, limited opportunities
for work and recreation, inadequate educational opportunities, homo-
sexual rapes, drug addiction, crime, brutal punishment for infraction
of rules, racial tensions, and poor or inadequate medical treatment.
Ramsey Clark (1975, p. 193) has stated that prisons, by giving
absolute power to the staff over nearly helpless people, lead to the
corruption of power. He refers to prisons as "warehouses of human
degradation". And his assessment of prisons (pp 194-201) agrees with
that provided by Leinwand,
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Institutions
Rothman (1971, pp, 109-236), in an exceptional work, traced the
development of mental health institutions to the first half of the
nineteenth century. Prior to that time mental illness was viewed as
God's will and primarily a problem of poverty and dependence.
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Individuals who were mentally ill either received assistance by living
with relatives or the town provided assistance to the afflicted person
in their home. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however,
questions regarding the causes of mental illness and the treatment
of those afflicted were raised. These questions were prompted by
calculations that the incidence of the malady was increasing in
America, and intensive efforts at identifying causal factors were
initiated.
The cause of mental illness was felt to be related not to body
chemistry but to the social organization of America. In particular,
it was thought that social, economic, and political influences were
critical and that the debilitating effects of these influences were
only present in relatively civilized societies. Primitive societies
were thought to have been free from mental illness. The concern
over mental illness was heightened by this belief, since Americans
typically believed their country to be the most civilized nation
in the world.
The research intended to identify causal factors turned up very
little that was pleasing. The new nation appeared to be fraught with
dangers to mental health. A lack, of stability and the dissolving Oi.
traditions were seen to create stresses and strains which at times
overwhelmed individuals. The unusually fluid social order of America
was not viewed with pride, but, rather, as problematic. In a society
where sons did not automatically assume the work of their fathers and
employment potential was viewed as unlimited and based upon individual
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skills, it was inevitable that some persons, consumed with ambition,
would aim at accomplishments which they were incapable of achieving.
For many, mental powers were strained to their utmost and the result
was often mental illness.
Dangers lay in wait even for those who achieved lofty aims, for
once reached, the socio-economic level was significantly changed and
the resultant change in life style was often difficult to adjust to.
The change from a simple life to a more complex one was accompanied
by considerable anxiety centered around the transition itself
and around the desire to maintain the new position. Since upward
mobility created such strains, it was felt to be a frequent contributor
to mental illness.
Democracy was viewed as contributing to society’s mental problems.
The ordinary voter was felt to be in a state of constant turmoil over
one issue or another and which candidates to vote into office. Political
debates and elections created public agitation which taxed mental
faculties. This burden of responsibility of a democratic society led
at times to mental illness.
A lack of stability in the accepted body of knowledge of the day
also took its toll, American society was going through profound
change at this time. Beliefs and traditions which had previously
been held were constantly being questioned and the generation of new
.
ideas and knowledge was occurring at an ever increasing pace. If sucn
inquiries had been confined to those who were highly educated, a pro-
blem may not have existed. But many Americans without formal educatxon
.
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and lacking an appreciation of logic were actively involved in dis-
cussing complex subjects. The result was excessive mental strain and
frequently mental illness.
The family and the school, both having the ability to moderate
the dangers found in society, were seen as chief villians in the
situation and the frantic and unstable qualities of society were
primarily attributed to them. Schools admitted children too early,
kept them in classroom too long, crammed children with information as
quickly as possible, and considered recreation and rest to be a waste
of valuable time. Worse yet, the attitudes of the schools were support-
ed in the home. Parents instilled their children with ambitions
for social and intellectual achievement and insisted that schools convey
ever increasing amounts of knowledge to their children. The family,
which could have protected children from the adverse effects of
society, was charged with heightening the impact of these factors.
Like the reformers who found the origins of crime in the community,
psychiatrists linked mental illness to social organization. The
implications for both crime and mental illness were similar. That is,
wherever the individual turned, some hazard which was beyond his
control waited for him. The existence of vice in society turned a
person toward crime, and mental stress created by societal pressures
lad to mental illness. Concepts such as these led eventually to the
belief that mental illness was curable. All one need do was to change
the environment for a person who was mentally ill. Ideally, changing
society would have produced the best result, but since tnat taste was
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far too overwhelming, a second solution became attractive. That is, a
separate environment which did not have the stress and chaos found in
the larger society would be established by psychiatrists. This new
environment would exemplify the advantages of an orderly, regular, and
disciplined routine. Such a setting, by isolating afflicted persons
from the adverse effects of society, in addition to helping the
individual in question, would demonstrate the benefits of this system
to the larger society. The missionary zeal behind this movement must
not be underestimated. The ideal setting which was being prescribed
led to the development of mental health institutions. These institutions
were not only supposed to cure mental illness but were also to lead
to the education and reformation of the total society by their example.
The development of these institutions was rapid. Before 1810 only
one state, Virginia, had a public institution. By 1850 almost every
northeastern and midwestern state supported a mental health institution
and by 1860, twenty eight of the thirty three states had public facili-
ties. With the establishment of these institutions there also came
what was later to be called the "cult of curability" (Deutsch, 1949,
p. 133). The cult of curability, which was advocated by psychiatrists
and their lay supporters, insisted that mental illness was not only
curable but was more curable than most other ailments. It was believed
that appropriately designed and organized institutions could cure
almost every case of mental illness.
The new program for treating mental illness first called for
the
prompt removal of afflicted persons from the community. At the very
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first sign of mental illness the individual was to enter a mental
institution. Second, the institution was to be separate from the
community. It was to be built far from population centers and was to
function as independently from the surrounding community as possible.
The setting for institutions was to be tranquil and rural, and the
facility was to reinforce isolation by prohibiting visits and corres-
pondence. Third, moral treatment was to be provided. Moral treatment
would provide an antidote for the instability of society and would
curb uncontrolled impulses by creating a fixed and stable environment.
In providing this treatment, facilities had to control residents in a
humane manner, creating as little stress as possible. This, of course,
was a difficult task and in order to accomplish it superintendents
designed and implemented an extremely rigid routine and calendar and
insisted upon daily labor. A rigid, carefully spelled out schedule
and regular work became the prescription for cure within these
institutions. The insistence upon work was not only believed to be
therapeutic but was also economically sound.
Obviously, a stress upon orderliness and rigid schedules calls for
extreme control of residents in such a facility. These early
facilities stressed the importance of avoiding punitive discipline in
carrying out their mission and though there were institutions which
did not abide by this concept, most probably did. A great
deal or
administrative diligence was necessary but by and large, these
early
institutions did succeed in doing away with harsh
punishments anci m
treating patients in a humane fashion.
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One of the most astounding discoveries in the records of this
reform effort is the statistical information which these early
institutions generated. The published rates for cures were greatly
exaggerated and superintendents deliberately distorted data, some
going so far as to declare a one hundred percent cure rate. Rothman
Cp. 132) believes that personal ambition played a considerable part
in the distorting of this information since frequently state
bureaucracies used the number of reported recoveries in determining
appointments and promotions. Superintendents often found themselves
in the position of trying to outdo one another, and as soon as one
superintendent announced his results, other superintendents were
encouraged to match if not exceed his. With the absence of any infor-
mation to disprove these announcements, the erroneous claims tended
to substantiate, one another. In addition, the claims were used as
arguments to obtain additional support from state legislatures. It
was not until the 1870 T s that the claims were finally disproved. One
cannot help but be amazed at the existence of a forty year period in
our history when novel and radical claims were made, and yet no serious
challenge to those claims was forthcoming. At any rate, by the end of
the 1870’s the cult of curability was dead and American society
no
longer believed it had the ability to cure mental illness.
Prior to the nineteenth century there were no public or
private
facilities charged with the care and education of the
mentally
retarded on the North American continent. Before the
establishment
of such facilities, retarded persons who could not
care for themselves
124
experienced the same treatment as the mentally ill. Even after the
establishment of mental health institutions the retarded continued to
be a neglected group and could frequently be found in early mental
health institutions (JBaumeister, 1970).
The impetus for the development of institutions for the retarded
originated in Europe. Johann Guggenbuhl is acknowledged as the
originator of the idea of institutionalized care for the mentally
retarded (Kanner, 1964, p, 3Q) . In 184Q he established an institution
to provide educational and residential services in Switzerland. Other
work in Europe provided hope that the retarded could be educated.
For example, the work of Jean Itard and his successor Edward Sequin
affected the commonly held perceptions of a retarded person's ability
to learn and develop Chest, 1965, p. 163).. The two men developed
two methods of "teaching the retarded which were later to be adopted
in the institutions of the United States (Baumeister , 1970). The
first was called the physiological method and was a system of sensory-
motor activities that varied from simple muscle activities to
complex vocational and social skills. The second was called moral
treatment and called for retarded persons to be treated with dignity,
warmth, and kindness.
Samuel Howe is credited with the development of institutions
for the retarded in the United States CKanner, 1964, p. 39).
In 1845
he took a group of retarded children into his home and
personally
supervised their education. In 1846 he was able to convince
the
Massachusetts legislature to investigate the condition
of the mentally
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retarded in the Commonwealth and also to determine whether anything
could be done for their relief. Howe, as chairman of the committee,
presented the report in 1848. The report convinced the legislature
that methods had been found to teach the retarded and that it was
the responsibility of the Commonwealth to provide education for all
its children. The legislature responded by funding, for a three year
period, an experimental school for a small number of retarded children.
Three years later a committee evaluating the school declared the
experiment a success. The legislature, based upon that evaluation,
established a permanent institution which later became known as the
Walter E. Fernald State School in Waltham, Mass.
Other states soon followed suit. In 1851 a residential school
for the mentally retarded was opened in Albany, New York. In 1853
Pennsylvania established the third institution for the retarded, the
Pennsylvania Training School for Feebleminded Children. Ohio built
an institution in Columbus in 1857, and in 1858 Connecticut followed
the course of the other states. By 1874 there were seven state
institutions and several private ones in existence (Best, 1965, p. 170).
By the end of the nineteenth century more than half of the states had
either public or private institutions for the retarded.
The founders of the first institutions had as their goal the
return of the retarded person to the community. The early literature
demonstrates a blind faith in the efficacy of the physiological method.
Mental retardation was conceptualized as a lag in the development of
intelligence and with hard work the mind could be trained. Sequin even
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believed that the cranium enlarged with education and that mental
retardation could be cured, Considerable effort was made to inform
the public that these new institutions were schools and not custodial
in nature and, in fact, they made no provision for permanent custody
(Baumeister, 1970),
Reports from these early institutions tended to reflect amazing
results (Baumeister, 197Q). The experimental school in Massachussetts
declared that it was entirely successful and had proved that retardation
was curable, Baumeister believes that superintendents used these
glowing reports to convince a skeptical citizenry and legislature that
their work was worthwhile. Indeed, many persons believed that little
could be done to benefit the retarded. Reactions of fear and aversion
were frequently associated with mental retardation and many persons
believed that ta-x dollars could be better spent.
Persons, however, who were involved in establishing these
facilities went about their work with humanitarian zeal and believed
their efforts went toward rescuing afflicted members of society from
their condition (Best, 1965, p, 171). This zeal, similar to that
expressed in the. movements to establish, penitentiaries and mental
institutions, was part of a wave of humanitarianism which swept the
country. The data from the mental health institutions gave courage
to the reformers in mental retardation and reinforced therr belief
that all handicaps could be overcome. The wave of humanitarianism
was evidenced most clearly in religious papers of the time (Best,
1965, p. 191), which looked upon the movements as miraculous
and
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gave their total support to them. Religious papers, when mentioning
the reform efforts, described them in glowing terms.
By the 1870 ? s, however, it had become apparent that many of the
earlier claims of success were inaccurate. The physiological method
was no longer viewed as being capable of producing the results
previously believed. The role of the institution as an educational
agent began to evaporate and custodial care began to assume a position
of dominance in these facilities. By 1875 leaders in the field called
for long term custodial care, and a trend began toward construction
of larger institutions. Indeed, the American Association of Mental
Deficiency stated in 1876 that only a small number of the retarded
are capable of community living (Doll, 1962). It is curious to note
that institutions were built at a faster rate after they were regarded
as custodial rather than education in intent (Baumeister, 1970).
Both mental health and mental retardation institutions were
developed with the promise that they could provide a useful service
for both society and individual clients. As with prisons, their failure
to produce good results received public attention about the time
when social Darwinism became popular. Additionally, the eugenics
movement hnd dramatic negative impact on the plight of the mentally
retarded and the mentally ill. The eugenics movement, more than any
other factor, led to the decay of these facilities and prevented
any
further efforts at reform. The movement postulated that many
characteristics such as mental illness, mental retardation, and
habitual
criminality,- are the direct result of heredity and that allowing
persons
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with these characteristics to propagate would increase their occurence
in the general population,
Richard Dugdale in 1877 published a book which was to become
a landmark in eugenics literature, Dugdale, who was a penologist,
noticed several persons from the same family incarcerated in a prison.
Ee conducted a genealogical survey and was able to obtain information
on seven hundred and nine descendants. Of these, one hundred forty
had been imprisoned, two hundred eighty were dependent upon public
support, and a majority had low moral standards. In 1912 Henry
Goddard, a leader in the field of mental retardation, published The
Kallikak Family . Goddard claimed that his research showed beyond a
shadow of a doubt that mental retardation and other undesirable
characteristics had been transmitted by heredity for generations in
a given family,' Ando so, for a time, this type of literature
abounded (Kanner, 1964, pp. 128-138). To make matters worse, it was
believed that the efforts made to assist mentally retarded or mentally
ill people inevitably led to an increase of these conditions in
society by enabling such persons to live without supervision.
The eugenics movement had several results. First, any thought of
educating the retarded or helping the mentally ill to live in
the
community became unthinkable. Why should society assist
devalued
persons when such assistance can only increase the
community's problems?
Second, in an effort to prevent these afflicted persons
from pro-
creating, a number of states passed laws prohibiting
them from marriage
and gave the state the authority to sterilize
certain individuals.
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In 1914 (Smith, Wilkinson, & Wagoner, 1914) thirty nine states had
laws forbidding persons such as the retarded, the mentally ill, and
epileptics from marrying. Assisting in the marriage of or engaging
in intercourse with such persons could be punishable by imprisonment.
Twelve states gave the authority to sterilize certain persons in
prisons, mental health institutions, and mental retardation institutions.
Included in the list of persons eligible for surgery were habitual
criminals, the mentally ill and the retarded. Third, the nature of
the early institutions for the mentally ill and the retarded was
changed. When they were established, those institutions, were primarily
concerned with the well-being of individual clients. But after the
coming of the eugenics movement, they became primarily concerned with
protecting society (Emerick, 1912).- Fourth, the eugenics movement
further devalued the mentally ill and retarded and increased the
fear associated with these groups, creating an atmosphere in which
many forms of client abuse were allowed to develop and prosper.
One need make only a casual search of the literature on the
subject to conclude that mental health institutions' have still not
recovered from the adverse effects of social Darwinism and the
eugenics movement. To Thomas Szasz O-970, p. 58), mental institutions
appear harsh and oppressive. Other researchers (e.g. Herz,
Endicott,
& Spitzer, 1975; Sommer, 1959; and Nettler, 1952) have shown
a
negative relationship between length of stay in these facilities
and
outcome. Grimes (1949), who through his work with the
American Medical
Association' was able to personally visit forty percent
of
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tut ions, in the United States and read reports regarding the remaining
sixty percent, concluded that treatment tended to be totally absent
in these facilities. He found that psychiatrists did not help
matters and that their "orders, euphemistically called treatments,
are carried out by guards, behind locked doors, to the accompaniment
of insult, intimidation, and abuse" (p. 16). Abuse of patients in
the facilities was rampant and involved diverse approaches including
beatings with a bar of soap in a sock of forcing a patients head under
water until he strangled (pp 101-102) . All patients were abused at
One time or another, and the most abused group tended to be those who
are the most helpless and thus, most in need of assistance (p. 58).
Institutions were typically overcrowded, and the residential areas
violated fire codes (p. 70). Many residents spent twenty-four hours
a day naked, filthy, and in restraints or seclusion rooms. Grimes
concluded that through public neglect and a lack of legislative
financial support , these institutions are "little more than concentration
camps" (p. 69).
Other authors have found that staff members in these institutions
wield all the power and that patients find themselves in a position
always subservient to staff (Deyereux, 1944; Bateman & Dunham, 1949,
and Stanton & Schwartz, 1954, p. 170). The American Civil Liberties
Union became so concerned over the violation of patients’ rights that
they supported the publication of a book advising these patients of
their rights (Ennis & Siegel, 1973). LeBar (1964) found that the roles
institutionalized mental patients are frequentlywhich develop among
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not consistent with therapeutic goals and there is a tendency for
dominance-submissive relationships to be formed. Conditions in these
institutions have been so bad that courts have at last become involved.
For example, at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, the mental institution in
the District of Columbia, the court, in answering a right-to-treatment
suit, found that patients frequently receive no treatment at all
(Rouse V. Cameron, 1966). It is important to note that under the
Durham ruling, persons found not guilty due to insanity were frequently
sent to St. Elizabeths,
Bateman and Dunham (1949) t in exploring the realities of institution-
alization f.or mental patients, concluded that patients spent a consid-
erable amount of time protecting themselves from the more vicious or
dangerous aspects of their environment. They also found that these
facilities tended to impede recovery by an insufficient quantity of
organized activity, therapeutic interventions and staff training.
There also tended to be a lack of respect for patient wishes and an
emphasis on detailed and, at times, trivial rules whose violation
predictably resulted in punishment.
Lima State Hospital in Ohio, a mental health facility for the
criminally insane, was rocked by an expose conducted by The Plain Dealer ,
a Cleveland daily newspaper. The articles described vicious beatings
(Whelan & Widman, Hay 14, 1971), the abusive use of drugs by staff to
control patients (Whelan & Widman, May 17, 1971), the use of electric
shock treatments as punishment G^helan & Widman, May 20, 1971), homo-
sexual rape (Whelan & Widman, May 25, 1971), negligent medical practices
132
(Whelan & Widman May 26, 1971), and murder (Whelan & Widman May 27, 1971
1971). Obviously, such as environment can hardly be called therapeutic.
Mental retardation institutions appear to be plagued with the same
problems as mental health institutions. As of 1968 there were 167
mental retardation institutions in the United States (Baumeister,
1970). The rated capacity of these institutions was 191,587 persons
and, since this rated capacity included some institutions that had
not yet opened and the actual population was found to be 199,694
individuals, it can be concluded that considerable crowding exists.
The professional staff in these institutions frequently does not
meet the qualification standards acceptable in the community (Baumeinster
,
1970, 1967), For example, many physicians in these settings are not
licensed for private practice. Attendants, who are the most in-
fluential staff' in respect to the everyday welfare of the mentally
retarded client, are poorly paid, receive little if any training, and
usually have poor skills relative to the tasks they have to perform
(Baumeister, 197Q).
A number of authors believe that institutions have detrimental
effects upon the ability levels of mentally retarded persons residing
with them. Herber and Deyer (1970) believe that present institutions,
because of their isolation from the community, the regimentation of
clients, and the existence of numerous and repressive rules, are
poor
settings for habilitation. These settings create their own
cultures
which are at contrast with the community and therefore, when a
retarded
client moves from the institution to the community,
adjustment
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*-culties occur. While some research efforts have not demonstrated
that institutions have adverse effects upon retarded clients, the vast
bulk have so stated. Research by Badt (1958) Denny (1964). Lyle
(1959)
,
and Schlanger (1954) have shown that institutions have
deleterious effects on such behaviors as language ability, ability
to abstract, and ability to learn discrimination tasks. Courts
(Parisi, et. al. V, .Carey et, Al., 1975), have even found that
treatment tends to be entirely absent in many of these facilities.
Other information exists which suggests that not only do mental
retardation institutions fail to provide treatment but that they all
too frequently represent cruel and unusual punishment. Blatt and
Kaplan (1966), visting one of these facilities during the Christmas
season of 1965, labeled it a "hellhole" and found human beings living
in conditions that the community would not tolerate for animals.
A right to treatment suit brought in Alabama for two mental health
institutions and one mental retardation institution found that
clients had been denied their right to treatment and the conditions
at these facilities were "grossly substandard, hazardous and deplorable"
(Wyatt et. al, V. Stickney et, al., 1972), The court was so disturbed
over the conditions it found that it issued an emergency order to
protect the lives and well-being of the clients. The court concluded
that these institutions were not furnishing treatment and only led to
deterioration and debilitation of clients. Safety and sanitary
conditions were so poor that the health and lives of residents were
endangered; wards were grossly understaffed and overcrowded;
conditions
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were such that simple custodial care became impossible. Clients
were frequently mistreated, abused, and subjected to corporal
punishment.
A right to treatment suit filed in Massachussetts (Ricci, et. al.
V • Greenblatt, et. al.
,
1973) on behalf of clients residing in a
dental retardation institution claimed that a lack of treatment was
only one problem at the facility. Conditions at the institution were
said to be "so shockingly oppressive, unsanitary, unhealthy and
degrading that they are an affront to basic human decency." Not only
was there an absence of developmental services, but medical services
were typically poor or absent. The brief cited frequent heterosexual
and homesexual attacks, physical assualts, the abusive use of chemical
and physical restraints, the frequent use of cruel punishment, the
existence of residential areas which violated the State Sanitary Code,
the presence of excrement and urine which were visible and unattended,
the overpowering odor which was present in living areas, the fact that
raw sewage had at times backed up into residential areas, a continual
shortage of sanitation supplied, and an ever-present clothing shortage,
which caused many clients to be continually nude. The court found
the cited charges to be a reflection of actual conditions and consent
decree in favor of the plaintiffs was accepted.
A right to treatment suit filed in Ohio CSidles, et. al. V. Delany
,
et. al,
,
1975) alleged similar conditions. The court recognized the
allegations as accurate and accepted a consent decree proposed by
state officials. During a recent conference, Michael Thrasher (1976),
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from the United States Justice Department, stated that his office
was currently involved in twenty-two right to treatment suits.
Thesd suits involve both mental health and mental retardation
institutions and his visits to these and other similar settings has
led him. to conclude that mental health and mental retardation facilities
frequently represent cruel and unusual punishment rather than treat-
ment .
Summary and Conclusions
Traditionally, arguments regarding criminal responsibility have
revolved around whether the offender should receive punishment or
treatment for the offense. Persons found not guilty due to insanity
are typically sent to either a mental health institution if they are
emotionally disturbed, or to a mental retardation institution if
they are retarded. These two types of facilities supposedly provide
treatment to the offender. Prisons, on the other hand, are supposed
to represent punishment.
Punishment is defined as the delivery of a noxious experience by
an authority figure to someone who has violated the law. Punishment
can have one or more of the following as its goals j retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and individual intimidation. Treatment
refers to an individualized approach in that each offender is evaluated
to determine the cause of the criminal behavior which results in a plan
of action designed to prevent law breaking in the future. The plan of
action can involve noxious experiences, and both punishment and treat-
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rnent have behavior change as an objective.
Prisons and mental health and mental retardation institutions
are conceptualized as total institutions (Goffman, 1961 p. XIII). A
total institution is a "place of residence and work where a large
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society
for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed,
formally administered round of life." All these facilities are fairly
recent and were "invented" during the nineteenth century in reform
movements. Prisons were developed first to end the cruel and harsh
punishments formerly given out in court, and second, to change the
behavior of convicted criminals by placing them in a vice-free
environment and forcing them to reflect on the error of their ways.
Mental health institutions also originated in a concern for the well-
being of certain individuals. At that time it was believed that
societal instability was the cause of mental disturbance and,
therefore, that placing a mentally disturbed person in a stable
environment in an institution should lead to recovery. Besides
being interested in helping their client populations, both prisons
and mental health institutions also had a much more ambitious goal.
Leaders in these reform movements believed that prisons and mental
health institutions, by demonstrating what they could do, would lead
to the reform of society as a whole. Mental retardation institutions
originated with a concern for the retarded individual, and the mission
of the early facilities was to provide developmental services in
order to enable retarded persons to live in the community.
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Both the origins and histories of these total institutions are
similar. In the first few decades of their existence many claims
of success were made. These facilities were "curing" criminals, the
mentally disturbed, and the mentally retarded. By the 1890’s no one
believed that these facilities were completing their missions. At
the same time the popular acceptance of social Darwinism and the
eugenics movement changed the nature and function of these institutions.
These institutions changed from being concerned about their clients’
well-being to protecting society from criminals, the mentally dis-
turbed, and the retarded, who were perceived with fear and thought to
be dangerous in relation to societal interests. With the influx of
such thinking, the institutions began to deteriorate rapidly. By
establishing a dramatically unequal power distribution between staff
and clients, removing activities from public view, and finding it
necessary to control and regiment the behavior of residents while at
the same time suffering from severe resource shortages, the facilities
eventually become citadels of degradation and dehumanization for
residents.
It seems that any argument which assumes that prisons are for
punishment and mental health and retardation institutions are for
treatment is making erroneous assumptions. The present author
believes
that any society which does not try to prevent criminal
behavior is
closings its eyes to reality. Though present day
understanding of
the causes of criminal behavior is sorely lacking,
research which
utilizes the treatment model and is oriented towards
identifying
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effective interventions appears to be warranted. If effective inter-
ventions became known, it would be wise to apply them regardless of
the issue of criminal responsibility. The present author’s concern
over criminal responsibility does not revolve around the idea that
some offenders should be punished and others treated but, rather,
originates from the idea that persons who are not criminally respon-
sible should not receive any "services" at the direction of the court
unless certain other conditions are present (their behavior strongly
indicates that they are a danger to the community and there is a
guarantee that appropriate services can be provided.)
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CHAPTER VI
NORMALIZATION
Raveriel and Bush (1976) believe that the recent improvements in
services for the mentally retarded in this country are primarily
due to the acceptance of the principle of normalization as the
philosophical base for changing and developing these services (Mesiboy,
1976). The present author, however, believes that normalization has
not been accepted by most professionals in the field beyond the verbal
level, as evidenced by the conditions which still too frequently
exist. There has been, however, a trend toward change in the last
ten years which appears to be gaining momentum, and the changes
which have occurred usually have shown the effects of normalization.
The author, observing this trend and bringing some degree of optimism
to bear, can easily envision a time when normalization will be
typically evidenced by the service system for the retarded in the
United States,
The philosophy within the field of retardation, therefore, appears
to be changing from one based on fear and revulsion toward the
retarded to one of, action on behalf of individuals possessing develop-
mental potential and human and legal rights. Because of the growing
importance of normalization in the field of developmental disabilities
and, because this concept appears to be relevant to the
discussion
of criminal responsibility, it is examined in this chapter.
In addition
to exploring the meaning of the concept, its application
in mental
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retardation systems and its meaning for the criminal justice system
are included.
The Concept of Normalization
The concept of normalization was first used by Bank-Mikkelsen,
head of the Danish Mental Retardation Service, when he stated that
the retarded should experience an existence as normal as possible
(cited in Nirje, 1969). Bank-Mikkelsen was able to convince the
legislative body to include this principle in the 1959 Danish law
regarding services for the mentally retarded. Nirje (1969) was the
first person to elaborate the principle and publish it in the
United States. According to Nirje, normalization "refers to a
cluster of ideas, methods, and experiences expressed in practical
work for the mentally retarded" as adopted in the Scandanavian
countries. Normalization means "making available to the mentally
retarded, patterns and conditions of everyday life which are as
close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of
society." This principle is not meant to apply only to a subgroup of
the mentally retarded population but, rather, to all of these persons
including severly and profoundly retarded individuals and those who
are multipli-handicapped . The Joint Commission of the Accreditation of
Hospitals, the major standard setting body for mental retardation
services in the United States, has adopted and defined the principle
of normalization in its handbook entitled Standards for Residential
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (1975) as "the use of means whicn
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are as culturally normative as possible to elicit and maintain behavior
which, is as culturally normative as possible, taking into account
legal and subcultural differences." The most comprehensive treatment
of the normalization concept has been produced by Wolf ensberger (1972).
His definition states that normalization is the "utilization of means
which, are as culturally normative as possible, in order to establish
and/or maintain personal behaviors and characteristics which are as
culturally normative as possible" (p. 28). These definitions seem to
indicate that the normalization principle is culture-bound in that
each culture has its own standards for behavior. "Normative" refers
to statistics rather than morals and could be conceived as that which
is typical. -
The normalization principle is based upon the reasonable assumption
that a normative environment elicits and maintains normative behavior.
On the other hand, environments which are significantly different than
that found in society lead to the development and maintenance of
behavior which is maladaptive in society. It seems obvious that
placing an individual with a learning disability in an environment
which encourages the development of inappropriate behavior further
handicaps that person should he return to society.
Many authors have written about problems with the concept
of
normalization. Throne 0-975) contends that the retarded become
identified as such only when normative procedures have
been attempted
and have failed. Therefore, normalization is
misleading since the
retarded do not develop normally in response to
normative procedures.
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Throne calls for the application of extraordinary procedures for
speeding up the developmental rate for retarded persons and sees
normative procedures as perpetuating the same retarded developmental
rates which they were responsible for establishing in the first place.
This criticism of normalization has taken a superficial view of a
deceptively complex principle. When Wolfensberger calls for "procedures
which are as normative as^ possible," he obviously intends a great
deal of flexibility in procedures to establish the desired end, a normal
developmental rate. However, procedures must deviate as little as
possible from cultural norms in meeting desired goals, and a blanket
statement that different procedures must he used for the retarded
without stipulating that these procedures must deviate minimally
from culturally normative ones leaves the door open for establishing
more of the faulty institutions which are all too prevalent in our
society and which in the author *s opinion, deprive the retarded living
within them from experiencing a normal existence, thus leading to the
development of maladaptive behavior.
Mesibov (1976 ) acknowledges that the normalization principle has
been extremely valuable but sees a need for additional refinement
of the concept. As with any such concept, normalization should be
continually re-examined and refinements and changes made when
appropriate. A major difficulty has been that while normalization is
intuitively appealing as a concept, there are no acceptable criteria,
for evaluating the effectiveness of the normalization model against
alternative formulations. Thus, normalization is not readily amenable
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to confirmation or refutation.
Edgerton, Eyman, and Silverstein (1975) have noted that there has
been little effort to clarify what exactly is meant by normalization.
For example, what is meant by "local" or "subculture" standards? How
do we determine what the standards of the majority are? How does one
establish, when a strict interpretation of normalization should be
violated? And how can we identify the optimal point at which the
mentally retarded individual experiences a maximum of growth and
development? These questions continue to be unanswered, and it
appears that no simple answers exist. While we may, at some point,
be able to better answer such, questions as how to specify subculture
standards, it is unlikely that we will ever easily be able to decide
to what extent normative standards • should be violated with any
given individual. Since great variability exists among human beings,
and simple consistent formulae for action appear impossible, the
most valuable product of the normalization principle is probably the
orientation it provides in demanding that we make strenuous efforts
to meet normative standards.
The Application of Normalization
Frequently, it is believed that subscribing to the normalization
principle will enable quality services to be delivered less expensively
than they are typically provided today and that retarded persons will
make greater developmental gains, reducing the prevalence of retardation
Nirje, (1969) has stated that normalization can aid many retarded
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persons in achieving complete independence and social integration
and that many who will always require assistance will make developmental
gams due to normalization. No one is seen as being immune to the
beneficial effects of this principle.
Normalization has two major implications (Wolfensberger
,
1972,
pp. 31-42); the first is concerned with the interactions between the
mentally retarded individual and his environment, and the second is
concerned with how the retarded are perceived by others.
Regarding interactions, normalization dictates that we maximize
the behavioral competence of the retarded person which should lead
to normative interactions with other individuals and inanimate
objects in the environment. While services are in existence which
increase the behavioral repertoire of the retarded, this increase, in
and of itself is not sufficient. For example, expanding the vocabulary
of a person is not sufficient if pronunciation and speech patterns are
not similar to what is culturally accepted and the mentally retarded
individual who displays this verbal deviance from accepted community
standards requires programmatic interventions to ameliorate this
difference. Another example lies in the area of nutrition. Assuring
that individuals receive nutritious diets is important but does not
totally meet the requirements of normalization. If a person's weight
is outside of the normal range as dictated by the community, then
efforts to change his weight accordingly are indicated.
In terms of the interaction between the retarded person and his
inanimate environment, the building within which persons live, attend
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school, work, and engage in leisure time activities assumes a position
of extreme importance. If these structures prohibit individuals from
developing behaviors which are typically learned by the rest of
society, then they violate the principle of normalization and result
in retarding the development of a person who is already develop-
mentally disabled. Obviously, buildings can facilitate the develop-
ment of skills and habits. Examples which demonstrate this power
of buildings abound. If toilets have no facilities for toilet
paper or towels, persons in that environment never learn to use toilet
paper appropriately or to wash their hands after going to the bathroom.
If, in addition, large groups of persons sleep in large overcrowded
rooms, the concepts of personal space and property can never fully
develop. Such an environment leads- to ownership being determined by
possession, and stealing in such a situation is encouraged. Visitors
to institutions in different states cannot help but be aware of
similar bizzare behavior among residents who may be thousands of
miles apart. One behavior which is evidenced is the stuffing of
possessions under one's shirt at all times except when showering or
sleeping. Questioning of individuals who engage in this practice quickly
reveals that it is an effective, technique to maintain ownership of
possessions. Building design can even effect behavior such as decision
making. A physical environment which denies a person access to his
clothes, obviously prevents him from learning to decide which clothes
to wear on a given day.
The perception of the retarded individual by others is also affected
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by normalization. The more a retarded person's behavior differs
from cultural norms, the more he is perceived as deviant. Such a
perception increases the probability of the person being rejected
and encourages the development and maintenance of non-normative
behavior. Examples abound in our service system for the retarded
which adversly effect society's perceptions of the developmentally
disabled. The presence of large institutions which are separate
from the rest of society implies that the individuals within are so
different that they cannot participate in normal living. The
dilapidated condition of many of these facilities and the absence of
minimal standards of decency, such as privacy during showering or
the presence of toilet paper in bathroom, leads to the perception
that the retarded are devalued human beings little better than animals.
The existence of security screens or bars on windows in residential
buildings and the over-emphasis on security leads to the perception
of the retarded as dangerous.
The blatent absence of the normalization principle in services for
the retarded sets up a circular chain of inevitable events, a self
fulfilling prophecy. Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship. As
can be seen, placing a person in an institution for the retarded, in
and of itself, devalues the person and leads to the retarded person
being perceived as less than human. The resultant behavior which
develops because of the abnormal environment in the institution and
the affected interaction between the retarded person and others
further
reinforces the belief that the retarded must be placed in these
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Fig. 3. Saif reinforcement effects of non-normalized services
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institutions.
Obviously, a major tenet of the normalization principle is that
the retarded should be integrated into the mainstream of society.
Wolfensberger (1972, P. 48) defines integration as ’’consisting of
those practices and measures which maximize a person's (potential)
participation in the mainstream of his culture.” Integration can only
be achieved when the individual lives in a culturally normal setting
in normal housing,moves and communicates in ways that are typical
for his age, and is able to use community resources such as hospitals,
restaurants, theatres, stores, etc. The use of these and other
community facilities, however, only represents physical integration.
Unless social integration, whereby the retarded person is intermingled
with non-handicapped persons, is also included, the integration
process is incomplete.
As the above indicates, normalization mandates that the retarded
be treated the same as other persons in society as much as possible .
The implimentation of normalization theoretically not only benefits
the retarded individual hut also society. Establishing conditions
which maximize the independence of the individual minimizes the
amount of support which society must provide and enriches society
by increasing the interaction between the retarded and non-retarded.
Such as increase in interaction can only enrich the community by
exposing individuals to the full range of humanity.
Normalization is obviously relevant to the issue of criminal
responsibility. The principle dictates that simply applying the
label
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of retardation to a person does not mean that the individual should
be treated any differently than others while allowing that different
treatment may sometimes be necessary. However, the point at which
different treatment becomes appropriate is not clear, and the principle
offers no guidance other than to indicate that whenever possible all
persons should be treated equally before the law and careful thought
should be given in determining when special options become appropriate.
In the past, tests have been adopted by various states to determine
when an offender should be given special status and relieved of
criminal responsibility. These tests, however, have proved to be
unsatisfactory.
The reader will recall that the concept of mens rea gave birth to
these tests, and while the utility of these tests is highly questionable,
mens rea as a guiding principle may not be either misleading or useless.
As Chapter I showed, for an act to be considered criminal a ''guilty
mind" must also be in evidence. That is, the offender must have moral
knowledge and knowledge of consequences concerning his behavior,
intentions, and motives. This definition obviously focuses on the
criminal act, and that focus, in and of itself, is the problem with
the way mens rea is used in the area of criminal responsibility.
Suppose, for example, that a retarded person who is so severly handi-
capped that no one would consider him responsible for his acts, attacks
another individual and injures him. Upon questioning, the retarded
person states that hitting another person is wrong and that he
attacked the person because he was angry and knew that he could
injure
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the individual. Such responses meet the dictates of mens rea and
therefore, this retarded person should theoretically be considered
responsible. Obviously, this situation is not acceptable. However,
mens rea implies the ability to make informed
,
rational decisions.
The reader will note that this implication goes beyond the alleged
criminal act and takes into account how the person makes decisions
in general. Considering how an offender makes decisions in all
spheres. of his life would appear to provide a wealth of information
in deciding whether or not someone is responsible for his actions.
The author, in fact, seriously questions how juries use the criminal
responsibility tests prescribed by various states. It is likely
that, while the court attempts to focus on the criminal act itself,
jurists are influenced by the behavior exhibited by the defendant in
other areas.
The ability to make informed, rational choices is also important
in the area of competence and guardianship. Guardianship has been
defined as a ’'legal mechanism for substitute decision making"
(Kindred, 1976). The need for guardianship is predicated on the
inability of the ward to make informed, rational decisions. The
question of whether or not someone needs a guardian is answered in an
incompetency hearing. Someone who is found to be incompetent loses
civil rights and cannot do such things as obtain a license to drive a
car, establish a checking account, buy or sell property, or register
to vote.
It would seem that the issues of competency and criminal respon-
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sibility are closely related and this relationship has roots in the
birth of the United States. Jefferson, in writing the Declaration
of Independence
,
stated that "We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed. .. ."As Becker 0-951, p. 14) has indicated, this
statement can be reduced to four principles. First, man is subject
to the law of nature which is the revelation of the will of God.
Second, all men have certain natural rights. Third, the only
justification of government is to secure these rights for men. And
fourth, all just governments derive their security and power from the
consent of the governed. Retarded persons ajudicated incompetent not
only lose civil rights and thus personal freedom to pursue happiness
as they see fit, but they also lose the right to vote, and thus,
they are governed without consent. These losses occur not because
they have committed acts which lead society to conclude that they
are unworthy of these rights hut, rather, because they suffer from
a handicapping condition which. leads others to conclude that they
cannot make rational, informed decisions.
The loss of freedom experienced by incompetent persons would seem
to affect responsibility for violation of the law. Responsibility
and
freedom have a strong relationship in American society (Gustafson
t, Laney,
1968, p. 61 and Roberts, 1965, p. 13), and it is difficult to
see how
152
society can limit someones freedom through an incompetency hearing and
yet not allovr this decision to affect the issue of responsibility.
It would seem more reasonable that limits on personal freedom due to
incompetency should also limit the responsibility associated with
actions by the incompetent individual.
Summary and Conclusions
Within the field of retardation there has been a growing trend
toward change. The philosophical base for this change has been the
concept of normalization, which can be defined as the use of means
which are as culturally normative as possible in order to establish
and/or maintain personal behavior and characteristics which are as
culturally normative as possible. While this concept has certain
difficulties in its application, such as determining when means
or ends are as normative as possible, its primary value lies in the
orientation it provides. That is, retarded persons should be treated
as other individuals unless treatment differences can be justified.
'
With, such an orientation, simply the label of retardation does not
imply different treatment.
The application of the normalization principle should assist the
retarded in developing behavior which is considered normal by society.
This positive behavior change originates from two sources. First,
education of the retarded should have as a goal the development of
normal behavior, and placing the retarded individual in a culturally
normative environment should assit in eliciting and maintaining
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behavior which is normal. Second, the more retarded persons are
capable of demonstrating normal behavior and seen as living in a
’
normal manner
,
the more others will perceive the retarded as more
similar than different from the rest of society. This should
lead to the retarded being treated in a more normal manner by others
and thus, the development of normative behavior will be encouraged.
While normalization calls for treating the retarded normally, it
does allow for deviation. The question for the criminal justice
system to decide is when a retarded offender should be treated
differently and thus be relieved of criminal responsibility. Unfortun-
ately, normalization does not provide an answer to this question. It
is obvious that previous tests based upon the concept of mens rea
have proved inadequate. The present author, however, believes that
the problem with the interpretation of mens rea has been that it
focuses on the criminal act where in the case of retarded persons, it
would seem that a consideration of the individual's ability level, in
general, would be more appropriate. Mens Rea can be interpreted to
also include the ability to make informed, rational choices. This
shift in focus would de-emphasiza the criminal act itself and stress
the ability of the offender to make choices.
Interpreting mens rea as the ability to make choices clearly brings
up the issues of guardianship and competency. Since a guardian is
essentially a substitute decision-maker, a finding of incompetence
signifies the inability to make choices. A legal determination
of an individual's incompetency would appear to indicate that the
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person should not be criminally liable for two reasons. First, a
determination that an individual’s incompetency would appear to
indicate that the person should not be criminally liable for two
reasons. First, a determination that an individual’s decision-making
ability is so deficient that a loss of personal freedom and civil
rights becomes necessary clearly indicates that a normative approach
in legal matters is not appropriate. Second, historically,
responsibility and freedom go hand in hand in the United States, and
severlv curtailing someone’s freedom because of a handicapping
condition would appear to imply that the responsibility such a person
assumes should also be curtailed.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Since moat of our practices concerning the determination of
criminal responsibility have historical roots prior to 1843 and have
proved unsatisfactory or unworkable in many instances, the present
work can be viewed as a challenge to our legislators and criminal
justice system administrators to pull the issue out of the mire
created by false beliefs and past knowledge gaps. The current author,
however, believes that to present his recommendations as ultimate solu-
tions would be naive. Rather, these recommendations should be viewed
as a set of ideas, some new, some not so new, which may function
toward stimulating changes enabling the retarded individual to be
treated fairly by our criminal justice system.
All human service system issues, including the present one, should
be dealt with in a spirit of ongoing research. Too many times in
the past change efforts in human services which had been viewed as
providing ultimate solutions
,
created with their failures a loss in
motivation toward solving the original problems as evidenced by the
development of prisons, mental health Institutions and mental
retardation institutions. While we know much more about human behavior
today than we did during the nineteenth century, mankind’s body of
knowledge is always in a state of flux, some ideas being discarded
.as new ones are found.
Rather than proffer ultimate solutions, then, the present author
proposes that with the issue of criminal responsibility and with human
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sec vices in general, an action research, approach in which change
efforts become hypotheses rather than solutions be adopted. These
hypotheses must include a clear statement of objectives, means, and
assumptions, and also provide a means for validating themselves.
Further, the more readily change efforts can be divided conceptually
into separate components or hypotheses for separate validation, the
better able we will be in..coming to grips with human problems in
our society. This approach, of course, is common to scientific
endeavors in general. The "space race" of the late 1950's and early
196Q's, offers an illustration of this research method in action.
The United States was obsessed with "catching up with the Russians"
in space exploration, and many of our attempts to orbit a capsule
around the earth had ended in failure. Because the United States
was so determined to close the gap perceived between this country and
the Soviet Union, one of the most dramatic all-encompassing research
efforts of all time wa3 launched. The system being explored was
conceptualized as the rocket, having many components, and thousands
of experiments went into verifing the effectiveness of each component.
Further, experiments, were then conducted to validate the relationships
between these various components. This incredibly methodical and
thorough approach led eventually to the desired successes, when the
U,S. orbitted a man in space. This author feels strongly that human
services could benefit greatly from this research approach.
This chapter presents recommendations, many of which will hopefully
prove useful as components of laws or procedures in the criminal justice
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system. Additionally, a limited conversation of related issues for
those found not criminally responsible will be presented.
The Determination of; Criminal Responsibility
The purpose of criminal law is to define and reduce the incidence
of criminal behavior. In fulfilling their role in meeting this
objective courts in the United States have assumed that persons are
typically responsible for their behavior, and mens rea has been used
as the underlying philosophical principle in developing procedures
to determine whether or not a given offender is to be held respon-
sible, These procedures must first show that the individual is
suffering from a condition which makes him eligible for such a
consideration and secondly, must demonstrate that the person meets
the requirements established by the test adopted in the particular
state. Juries typically make these decisions.
This author recommends that persons continue to be considered
responsible unless evidence can be presented which indicates other-
wise, Mens rea should be maintained as a guiding principle, but its
interpretation should be broadened to mean the ability to make rational,
informed decisions.
While broadening the definition of mens rea would still call for a
subjective judgement, and this subjectivity is one of the complaints
frequently voiced in regard to criminal responsibility, it would bring
mens rea into line with competency and guardianship factors.
The
establishment of laws which equate a finding of incorapetency with
tne
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inability to assume responsibility for any violation of criminal codes
can remove decisions regarding criminal responsibility from the
emotionally charged atmosphere which frequently accompanies criminal
trials. The development of procedures within states that dictate
that all retarded persons who are eighteen or over be periodically
evaluated regarding their competency and need for guardianship
would appear to be valuable. Such a procedure would potentially pro-
vide increased agreement in these decisions by removing the determin-
ation of criminal responsibility from the atmosphere generated by
behavior which society sees as harmful.
To clarify the types of conditions which call for such a consider-
ation, the definition adopted by the American Association on Mental
Deficiency should be adopted on behalf of the retarded individual.
That is, retardation is demonstrated by a "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period."
A retarded person could, therefore, be identified only by acceptable
testing instruments and procedures which measure intelligence and
adaptive behavior. Since all of these instruments present some problems,
tests which are the least problematic should be selected. Obviously,
better tools are needed and as they are developed, they should replace
existing ones. States, however, must identify which instruments and
procedures are acceptable, In order for a conclusion of retardation
to be reached both intelligence and adaptive behavior must be at least
two standard deviations below the mean.
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The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals through its
manual entitled Standards for Residential Facilities for the Mentally
Retarded (1975) is serving in a leadership capacity in the field of
mental retardation, and many of the standards specified in the manual
are being adopted by state legislatures and by the federal government
in reimbursement programs. One part of these standards calls for
interdisciplinary evaluations of retarded persons once a year. These
evaluations are supposed to be comprehensive in nature and lead to
the indent ification of developmental and other needs and also to the
specification of programs to meet these needs. While many states
are calling for annual evaluations by interdisciplinary teams, they
are not, at this time, mandating that these teams also evaluate the
decision-making ability of clients in order that recommendations
regarding competency and guardianship can be made to the court. If,
however, comprehensive evaluations were conducted annually; questions
determining decision-making ability, competency, and guardianship
needs were addressed to retarded persons eighteen years and older;
conclusions that an individual is not capable of making rational
and informed decisions were presented to courts so that competency and
guardianship decisions could be made; and the inability to make
decisions was equated with the inability to be criminally responsible;
the issue of criminal responsibility would be resolved before criminal
acts occurred.
Since a number of states have two types of guardianship, guardian-
ship of person and guardianship of estate, clarification is in order.
Guardianship of estate simply means that the individual lacks the
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ability to make informed decisions regarding assets. Guardianship
of estate does not involve a general loss of civil rights such as
voting. In Contrast, guardianship of the person signifies that the
individual cannot make rational decisions in many of life’s spheres
and a general loss of civil rights is involved. Therefore, the
present author believes only guardianship of the person should be
indicative of the inability to assume criminal responsibility.
Laws regarding competency and guardianship are usually inadequate
(Brakel & Rock, 1971, p, 251). Frequently, states do not clearly
define conditions which may warrant guardianship but include such
terms as "insanity”, "lunatic", etc. Other states do not address the
subject of ability per se but state that the existence of any diagnostic
label determines in itself the need for guardianship. At times, the
fact that a person lives x^ithin a mental retardation institution is
taken as proof that guardianship is required
,
irrespective of ability
level. Obviously, the present author believes that the definition of
mental retardation presented previously should be adopted as identifying
a condition where the possibilities of incompetency and need of guardian
ship should be considered and not automatically assumed. Institution-
alization should also not be assumed to imply incompetency.
The determination of incompetency and guardianship needs should
occur only through hearings, which, as Allen, Ferster, and Weihofen
(1968, pp. 83-89) have shown, are frequently casual affairs and must
be changed if they are to assist society in criminal matters. In
proceedings to establish incompetency, factual events which demonstrate
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the person’s ability or lack thereof are theoretically required to be
presented. Often, this theoretical requirement is not met, and state-
ments introduced as evidence often consist merely of opinions and
conclusions reached by a physician with no specification presented of
the facts upon which the conclusions were based.
Since these proceedings can mean the loss of civil rights and, if
the recommendations made in this chapter are adopted, will determine
an individual’s standing before the criminal court, it is imperative
that safeguards be adopted which better enable the court to make
just decisions. Therefore, it is recommended that those alleged
incompetent have legal counsel at these hearings and that evidence be
limited to behavior and facts which indicate decision-making ability.
Recommendations regarding competency should only be made by inter-
disciplinary teams. The counsel for the alleged incompetent should
also have at his disposal an interdisciplinary team which can make
upon request, an independent determination of decision-making ability.
Adopting the recommendations specified in this chapter would give
courts the knowledge of whether or not an offender is criminally
responsible outside of the context of a harmful act. Retarded adults
who are known to the mental retardation system would have either been
determined to be incompetent or competent before any harmful act has
occurred. However, there would still be occasions when a retarded
individual not known to the retardation service system might commit
a criminal act. If such as individual has been living independently
and therefore, demonstrating that he is capable of making informed
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decisions, then that person would be held responsible for criminal
acts. In situations where retarded offenders are living with others
who it can be demonstrated function in a guardianship capacity without
legal sanction, the question of criminal responsibility can be raised.
Laws and procedures providing guidance for judges in these cases must
be established. Chapter IV demonstrated that some ability exists to
categorize retarded persons so that an estimate of their abilities
can be determined. Persons who are mildly retarded are typically
able to live completely independently and usually ''disappear" into
society. Moderately retarded persons can sometimes be competitively
employed and many achieve independent functioning. Severly and
profoundly retarded individuals need supervision, cannot work competi-
tively, and need assistance and supervision in such basic tasks as
bathing and eating. Therefore, it is recommended that persons
classified as mildly retarded be treated as responsible and severly
and profoundly retarded individuals be regarded as not responsible.
Only in the case of moderate retardation does the issue of criminal
responsibility become, debatable. Since this work argues for the use
of intelligence tests and adaptiye behavior results in determining
diagnosis and category, and since these data can be conflicting, two
additional recommendations are made. First, differing results
between intelligence and adaptive behavior tests should be resolved
in favor of the higher score as indicated in Chapter IV. Second,
when the prosecuting and defense attorneys present different information,
the court should mandate an independent evaluation, and power to make
the final decision as to category should reside with the judge.
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If a judge decides that severe or profound retardation exists
and thus, that the individual cannot be held responsible or make
informed decisions, a finding of incompetence and the assignment of
a guardian should follow. A determination of mild retardation
implies the ability to make rational, informed decisions and such per-
sons should be held responsible. Moderate retardation, however,
represents the gray area where questions of responsibility must be
determined by a hearing. These decisions should be made outside of
the context of criminal proceedings. Hearings which conform with the
recommendations for such hearings provided above should be held
regarding competency and guardianship.
'Related Problems
A finding that someone is not responsible does not totally resolve
the matter, for it must also be determined whether or not the individual
committed the alleged act and if so, what disposition should be made.
These decisions can only be made by our judicial system, which means
that a guardian and counsel must be assigned to the offender. Persons
who are not held to be responsible for their behavior and have been
shown to have committed illegal acts should not be subject to either
the criminal justice system or the mental retardation service system
unless the following condition is met. It must be shown by behavior
and not by inferences nor conclusions that the person presents a threat
to others and will probably continue committing harmful acts. This
again is a subjective judgement, and a threat to others may be
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constituted by threat of bodily harm or a violation of property rights.
Individuals who are perceived as presenting a continual threat to
society should be placed in the least restrictive environment where
they will receive reasonable supervision. This should be determined
primarily by the seriousness of the harmful acts. Treatment in such a
setting must be available, and the court, since it is committing the
individual, must assume the responsibility for reviewing the adequacy
of treatment to assure that it meets minimal standards. The present
author, however, does not believe that habilitation or rehabilitation
should be limited to retarded offenders. Any society which does
not attempt to establish a responsible citizenry has its head buried
in the sand, and while there are problems with the treatment approach
as discussed in Chapter Vj'if expanded to include an evaluation of
the individual and his environment, it can lead to the discovery and
development of interventions which assist the criminal justice system
in meeting its objectives. When making commitments of persons not
judged to be criminally responsible courts must mandate that facilities
specify what the goals of treatment are and periodically evaluate
whether or not the goals of their treatment have been met. As soon
as these goals are met, the person should be free from involuntary
commitment. In any case, an involuntary commitment for illegal
activity should include a time limit which is no longer than
that called
for in the criminal codes. In order to extend this time
limit, the
facility must be able to demonstrate that the person, through
his
observable behavior continues to present a clear and
present danger
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safety of others. These proceedings should be adversary in
nature and the committed individual should be represented by a
guardian and counsel. Extended involuntary commitments should be
reviewed at least annually.
Obviously, the recommendations made in this chapter call for more
than the writing of new laws and procedures. The education of
professionals within the criminal justice system is also necessary
for such changes to be realized. Additionally, the education of these
professionals should go beyond the issue dealt with in this work if
the retarded are ever to experience justice in our courts. As
Harrow (1976) has indicated, retarded persons are frequently not
recognized by criminal justice professionals, and therefore, many of
the rights built into the system to protect accused persons from
erroneously being convicted are not realized by the retarded. For
example, the Miranda decision which mandates that defendants be
appraised of their constitutional rights can be confusing to someone
of normal intelligence who is caught up in the emotional state
accompanying arrest. For the retarded person, an additional nandicap
exists which makes the understanding of these rights even more difficult.
Until society becomes educated regarding the needs and limitations of
the retarded and builds in procedures to assure these rights regard-
less of a person’s limitactions, justice will be a rare commodity for
individuals who possess developmental disabilities.
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